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OPSOMMING 
Die tesis handel oor argumentasie as synde ‘n ‘belief driven’ proses van sinmaking in 
organisasies. 
Dit is ‘n konseptuele analise wat poog om lig te werp op strategiese prosesse in organisasies 
veral ten opsigte van swak seine. 
Die resultate dui daarop dat ‘requisite variety’ met betrekking tot die identiteit van 
deelnemers aan strategiese denke belangrik is, sowel as die vaardigheid van ‘mindfulness’ 
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SUMMARY 
This thesis is about arguing as a belief driven sensemaking process within a strategy making 
environment.   
It is a conceptual analysis which attempts to shed light on ways to improve the modern 
strategy making process, through investigating the belief driven aspects of sensemaking, and 
in particular arguing as a means of identifying and amplifying weak signals.    
The findings suggest that requisite variety in the identities of the stakeholders in a strategy 
making team is important; that mindful sensegiving by stakeholders and the leader not only 
ensures awareness but also a focus on the intuitive application of tacit knowledge to identify 
weak signals and communicate these to a strategy making team as narratives.   
Narratives are stories or scenarios which are then debated by the participants in the strategy 
making, through a sensemaking process of rational debate or arguing which causes 
participants to set aside previously held beliefs and expectations and create new knowledge, 
or strengthens existing expectations and knowledge.   
Although the study has found promising information which may add to the body of 
knowledge, this will need to be tested through empirical studies.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
‘the future belongs to the unreasonable ones, the ones who look forward and 
not backward, who are certain only of uncertainty and who have the ability 
and confidence to think completely differently”   
GB Shaw 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The sentence, “How can I know what I think until I see what I say1” has been used by Karl 
Weick as a ‘recipe’ for sensemaking.  Weick himself admits that it is incomplete, and too 
neat and tidy for organizational settings in which:  “we are always arguing at particular 
moments in specific places to certain audiences”2.   Arguing in an organizational setting is the 
‘….means by which we rationally resolve questions, issues and disputes and solve 
problems.’3  
This thesis is about the use of arguing as a means of surfacing strategic opportunities from 
weak signals in modern organisations.  It is a conceptual analysis which attempts to shed light 
on the modern strategy making process through investigating the belief driven sensemaking 
                                                 
1  From E.M. Forster, Aspects of the Novel, (1927), p 101. According to Weick, this sentence is about 
justification, choice, retrospective sensemaking, discrepancies, social construction of justification, and 
action as the occasion for sensemaking. 
2  Mailloux, 1990, p 134, as quoted in Weick (1995) 
3  D.H Jonassen, B Kim, (2010)  
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aspects, and in particular arguing as a belief driven aspect of the sensemaking theory of Karl 
Weick as a means of surfacing weak signals in a strategy making process.  There is a lot of 
sensemaking research, however little that attempts to combine arguing as belief driven 
senemaking with weak signal identification in a strategy making process.  Sensemaking and 
strategy share many similarities: both attempt to make sense of events by the understanding 
of cues which are fitted into frames of reference, both are influenced by their ‘makers’, both 
are social processes taking place in organisations, and both look to retrospective moments to 
make the sense that is required.  Strategy is challenging as a research area as there is no 
generally accepted theory of strategy.  The interesting question is whether these similarities 
can be exploited to create a method of strategy making which fits today’s complex and rapid 
paced business environment.   
1.2 Sensemaking and Strategy 
Sensemaking is particularly relevant in organisational studies as it provides insight into how 
individuals in organisations give meaning to events which are experienced as surprises or 
shocks, in the form of weak signals that could lead to a competitive advantage.   Strategy 
making has traditionally been treated as the responsibility of leaders, who ‘bring together and 
interpret information for the system as a whole”4, but these individuals collectively 
experience the greatest information load in an organisation and are most likely to manage this 
load in such a way that tolerates error and thus miss weak signals. 
1.3 Turbulence 
There is an impermanence to life today which was not experienced by previous generations.  
The rate of global change and the turbulence5 the world is experiencing has been accelerating 
exponentially6.    Many of the tools and practices which we apply or use in our daily lives 
                                                 
4  Daft and Weick. (1984) 
5  For Brown and Eisenhardt (1998) this kind of environment is defined as “a situation that is subject to 
continuous and substantial changes which are uncertain and unpredictable“.  
6  Many scholars have referred to the increasing rate of change, including Alvin Toffler in Future Shock, 
but limited research has been conducted to measure the rate of increase.  Ray Kurzweil (2008) 
theorizes that Moore’s Law can be applied to the exponential change in other areas of technology.  He 
believes that as a technology matures, it becomes exponentially more effective, causing greater 
resources to become deployed towards further progress of that technology, in turn generating further 
exponential growth.  He cites technological progress as currently doubling every decade, implying that 
the technological progress made during the twenty-first century is equal to the progress made in the 
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become obsolete, often within our own lifetime.  The relevance of this is that: 1) we are more 
likely to experience information load than were our ancestors and leaders will experience 
similar growth in information load, exacerbating the challenge of noticing weak signals at 
this level; and 2) business experiences a level of product change and obsolescence not 
experienced before.    For business the value of a process to identify weak signals which can 
lead to new products, or services which will contribute to growth and profitability, before the 
competition identifies the potential, is more important than ever before.   
Societal frames of reference have changed considerably during the past forty years7.  These 
changed frames of reference have shifted the expectations which society has of the value to 
be delivered by business8, and the shift is ongoing: shareholder value which was the major 
business driver for forty years is now seen by some as the cause of the financial woes facing 
the world;  increasingly more stringent governance, corporate social investment and 
sustainability requirements as well as changing role of the Board have altered the way 
strategy is created and business is managed.   Boards increasingly delegate much of the 
responsibility for strategy making to the CEO and executives.   That said:  being able to stay 
ahead of the competitors remains a key driver for business today.   
Business systems today are very complex systems operating in turbulent environments, in 
which there is a myriad of possibility.  Predicting trends by extrapolating data and assuming 
linear feedback is dangerous and fraught with error and risk.  Dealing with complexity and 
being prepared to manage unpredictable events and the associated vulnerabilities which arise 
from complexity and on-going turbulence is the challenge facing the strategy makers of today 
and tomorrow9.  Forecasters must deliberately look for those weak signals which have the 
                                                                                                                                                        
previous 200 centuries.  Ansoff (1965) believed that rapid and discontinuous change post World War 
II would create turbulence and that new ways of strategizing would be necessary. 
7  Increased democratisation, emancipation of women, and other previously repressed classes and races, 
family dis-integration, improved access to education and literacy levels, immigration, urbanisation, the 
reduction in the power of some large religions, reduced nuptiality, and other changes within societies 
have impacted on the western world in ways that have not yet been fully quantified, but which have 
fundamentally changed the way in which society is constructed. .   
8     K Jensen, (2013), questioned the importance of shareholder value as a driver of business for the future 
in the wake of the 2008 recession;  
9    Black swan events such as the Tsunami of 2004 could have been predicted had analysts been paying 
attention to outliers in patterns.  The concept of Black Swans is an enterprise risk management 
concept first documented by NN Taleb.  For an event to be called a Black Swan, the event must be 
unpredictable, must carry a  massive impact, and after the fact, observers will concoct an explanation 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 4 
potential to make a big difference.  Ignoring complexity can lead to misplaced over-
confidence and decision-making based on expectations which are no longer linked to reality.   
We are living the unprecedented times of which Drucker warned: times in which we are more 
interconnected but further apart10 with the danger of more conflict as a result.  Times in 
which discontinuous change is part of everyday life and ‘success stories of yesterday have 
little relevance to the problems of tomorrow…the end of certainty11.”   Leaders need an 
improved perspective of the future in which they replace naiive determinism with a social 
sophistication in which they pay mindful attention to their environment in order to more 
effectively notice the cues of weak signals. 
The turbulence caused by rapid discontinuous change and unpredictable environments which 
have been particularly evident in global economies over the past forty years, have made the 
traditional linear approach to strategy-making impractical and high-risk.   Many countries in 
the world have become mixed economies12, struggling to create public services amid the 
shifting sands of regulation and de-regulation, while looking to business to build the 
economies.   Businesses are struggling with economic challenges, global competition and an 
increasingly regulated environment.   
Global interconnectedness has accelerated the speed of information exchange, while the 
commoditisation of many services has created a global society demanding instant 
gratification as well as access to global markets.  The access this society has via digital 
networks to knowledge and information implies a knowledge society: “..genuinely 
borderless.  Information, capital and innovation flow all over the world at top speed, enabled 
by technology, and fuelled by consumers’ desires for access to the best and least expensive 
                                                                                                                                                        
that makes it appear less   random and more predictable, than it was.  Although Black Swans are 
typically negative events, similar responses apply to positive events.  
10  Drucker (1998).  “As we advance deeper into the knowledge economy, the basic assumptions 
underlying much of what is taught and practised in the name of management are hopelessly out of 
date… Most of the assumptions about business, technology and organisation are at least 50 years old, 
they have outlived their time”  
11   C Handy (1996) 
12   A mixed economy is one in which the  private sector, profit seeking enterprises and the accumulation 
of capital drive the economy, although the state exerts considerable indirect influence over the 
economy through fiscal and monetary policies, often providing welfare benefits and environmental 
protection.    
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products.”13  The competition is no longer a local trader or even a national trader, but an often 
an unknown entity from another continent. Trade barriers have lifted through political 
changes, finally enabling truly global businesses to exist, with the attendant risks and 
opportunities which these bring.   Focusing on strategy is increasingly difficult in such 
times14 but more important than ever before15.   
The global financial crisis which began in 2008, has already begun a revolution in enterprise 
financial control, with sustainability requirements, and effective corporate governance 
becoming critical factors in strategic planning.   While these factors do not have a direct 
impact on the ability of a business to identify strategic opportunities, they add to the 
organisational ‘noise’, and contribute to information overload, which does have an impact on 
what it is that people focus on when making sense of strategy.  As the world moves through 
the recession and depression into a new growth cycle, further opportunities to redesign the 
way we think about the future of organisations will arise, necessitated by technological and 
managerial complexity and ambiguity, the need for business to take an innovative view of 
their value adding activities and the rapid rate of change anticipated in a new economic cycle.   
Although some scholars have predicted a return to simplicity16, the indications are that 
complexity will continue to increase, as multi-stakeholder approaches, environmental 
sustainability, financial regulation and corporate social responsibility gain importance amidst 
ever increasing competition, and shifting global trade patterns.  The interconnectedness of the 
global economy has made real the implications of the butterfly effect17 of chaos theory;  that 
sensitive dependence on the initial conditions, where a small change to a non-linear system 
can result in novel patterns of behaviour or trigger an unconnected state.      
The components within business and connections between the components have increased in 
number and complexity, characterised by uncertainty, ambiguity and discontinuous change.  
The webs of interdependent interactions in organisations: the causal connections which bind 
people together are both more fragile and more complicated.  Changes and shifts of emphasis 
                                                 
13  Ohmae, (1995)a. 
14   Gordon Brown (former British Prime Minister) referred to this in acknowledging that he found it hard 
to focus on strategy: as you have to deal with immediate events, like it a bank’s going to go under” 
(Viner, based on an interview for the Guardian, 20 June 2009) 
15   Mintzberg 1998 also noted the that strategy is of more importance in turbulent times. 
16   Grant (2008) 
17  Lorenz, EN. (March 1963). . 
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occur constantly during the streaming of organisational events.   The webs of interdependent 
connections are also open to external environments, where external events can sometimes 
profoundly affect the organisations.  Order is created through self organising processes which 
take place within the organisation itself.   The edge of chaos is found at the periphery of 
organisations, where they connect to the external world, and where time and space become 
one reality.   Attaining the competitive edge in the future will be greatly enhanced by an 
improved ability to make sense of weak signals through a strategy making process which 
avoids the arousal caused by information overload and dissonance, assists in pushing aside 
the organisational noise, to reach the patterns hidden in the flows of information.   Increasing 
turbulence18 increases the need for insightful strategy making which can enable organisations 
to take advantage of market opportunities19.   
The economic environment post the economic downturn of 2008 is one in which competitive 
advantage is ephemeral.    Being able to exploit and move in and out of states of advantage 
will contribute greatly to future success.  A new way of looking at strategy and strategy 
making20, seeing strategic advantage as a temporary, sometimes more permanent, driver of 
business will therefore add value to the business world.     
1.4  The Evolution of Strategy 
The development of strategy into a self-conscious method of planning or directing the future 
in a competitive manner began in the late 1950’s as many organisations began to factor 
                                                 
18   Turbulence is not new, but we are living in a time when the turbulence is unprecedented:  the global 
financial crisis which began in 2008 is one of the worst on record. The rate and pace of change is 
increasing with globalisation; increasing complexity  and accelerating information exchanges as well 
as huge market volatility.   
19  Strategic planning is more important, but also less structured in turbulent economic times or when 
businesses undergo a period of uncertainty or instability: compared to organisations in a state of 
stability, or operating in an environment of stability, where strategies or plans are articulated in detail 
and followed, without the need for adjustment.  Mintzberg believes (2005) that strategic planning rises 
in importance in turbulent or uncertain times. Gryskiewicz notes that this turbulence is the resonance 
that stimulates innovation and renewal.   
20  Pralahad and Hamel (1994) saw the competitive space as having changed dramatically from that of 
previous decades, due to both regulation and deregulation; less protectionism; structural changes 
brought about by technology, and technological discontinuities; excess capacity, mergers and 
acquisitions, environmental concerns, the emergence of trading blocks, globalisation.    In their view 
the ‘..thoughtful members of the academic community are increasingly recognizing that the concepts 
and tools of analysis that formed the backbone of the strategy literature during its period of major 
growth (1965-85) may need a basic re-evaluation in order to pave the way for new ideas..’ 
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global competition into their planning.  Alfred Chandler21 linked organisational structure to 
strategy, thrusting strategy into mainstream organisational research. His description of 
strategy22 increased the scope of business planning to include all aspects of a business, and 
the external environment.    
A strategy is most often assumed to mean a direction or plan of action; what lies behind the 
plan of action is strategy making.  Strategy making is part science, based on analysis and 
research and part art, based on intuition and deep knowledge.   Strategy today is the fluid, 
shifting means by which the impermanent organisation should be kept focused on an 
uncertain future.  It is therefore a constantly evolving process, growing and developing with 
business, management styles, the state of the economy, and societal and technological 
change.  High information load, ambiguity and high levels of complexity have increased the 
importance of sensemaking as an element of the organisational understanding needed to craft 
organisational strategies.    
1.5  Organisations and People 
Organisations are cultural phenomenon or ‘organisational societies’23 .  We experience these 
as the places where people come together in order to achieve collective goals.   As Heraclites 
reminded us two thousand years ago, you cannot step into the same river twice, because it is 
forever changing, and so it is with organisations.  The act or process of organising creates 
transient structures, which reside between the smoke and crystal24: talked into existence and 
crystalised through texts, yet existing on the edge of chaos.   
People are the social and cultural beings25 who create social routines, norms and practices in 
order to organise themselves and others to achieve goals26.   Our human experience is 
                                                 
21  Chandler, A.D. Jr. (1962), defined strategy as “..the determination of the basic long-term goals and 
objectives of an enterprise and the adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources for 
carrying out these goals. 
22  The determination of the basic long-term goals and the objectives of an enterprise, and the adoption of 
courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals.  
23  Morgan, (2006) 
24  Taylor and Van Every, (2000), quoted in Weick (2009) 
25  Weber (1949) “We are ‘cultural beings’, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate 
attitude towards the world and to lend it significance..’  
26  Durkheim The Rules of Sociological Method (1895) proposed that ideas become socially causative or 
social facts and these drive subsequent behaviour.  “The determining cause of a social fact must be 
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wrapped in organising:  from early childhood, people are associated with organisations such 
as schools, religious bodies and clubs27.  Being associated with organisations becomes a way 
of life for the majority of people.  They contribute to our beliefs, our self-concepts and our 
personal identities28, which in turn influence how we make sense of the world we inhabit. 
Organising originated with early man, who discovered the advantages to be gained from 
allocating or sharing tasks for the achievement of collective goals.  Early societies organised 
themselves to take advantage of the specialised skills of certain individuals for the betterment 
of all, and enhanced the identity of the skilled individuals in the process, keeping in the 
process the social elements or organising29.  Trading grew from organising and the acts of 
directing or controlling these activities became known as management.  Over time, as 
business evolved so did the art of management30 becoming complex and messy as managers 
took on more tasks in an increasingly uncertain world to meet the changing demands and 
needs of business.   Management actions include planning for an uncertain future and taking 
actions to attain organisational success.  This planning and action taking is more important 
during uncertain times than in stable and predictable environments, as during stable and 
predictable times organisational routines and scripts drive the organisation along prescribed 
paths.  Chia’s (2005) description of managing describes it clearly:  “Managing is firstly and 
fundamentally the task of becoming aware, attending to, sorting out, and prioritising an 
inherently messy, fluxing, chaotic world of competing demands that are placed on a 
manager’s attention.  It is creating order out of chaos.  It is an art, not a science.  Active 
perceptual organization and the astute allocation of attention is a central feature of the 
managerial task.”  Management has changed substantially since the industrial age.  Direction 
giving was always a key activity of management, but the scope of this direction giving has 
expanded to encompass finding a path through the turbulent complexity of business life as we 
                                                                                                                                                        
sought among the antecedent social facts and not among the states of the individual consciousness.”  
He believed that humans when in a group will inevitably act in such a way that a society is formed  
27  Pugh (2007) refers to the world we live in as an organisational world, where all people are members of 
formal organisations from early childhood onwards.  Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) make a similar 
comment:  “.. organising wraps around the flow of human experience..” 
28  Weick (1995)  
29  M Parker Follet (1918) saw organizations as “ A large organization is a collection of local 
communities…”   
30  M Parker Follet (1918) on management:  “The art of getting things done through people” 
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know it.  Direction creates a vision of the future: a strategy31 or strategies, to focus and 
mobilise the people within the organisation, and to which all activities of the organisation can 
be aligned.  Organisations today may have routines and scripts which keep the internal 
organisation relatively stable but have to contend  with the transition zone between fairly 
stable organisational routines and the turbulence outside: the edge of chaos.   This is also the 
zone where novel patterns emerge and innovation can be found or created.    The turbulence 
experienced today is evidenced in rapid and continuous change, a bewildering array of 
variables, and unexpected surprises.   In uncertain times, being able to recognise and make 
sense of the opportunity in weak signals and rapidly adapt the direction or strategy to 
capitalise on the opportunities identified, means a better chance of survival for the business.32  
Organisational systems today are both structured and unstructured, have sub-systems and are 
often non-linear open systems continuously interacting with their environment, and 
consequently, are complex systems.   Full of interruptions, ambiguity, and shifts in activities, 
organisations create multiple opportunities for sensemaking.    
Strategy for the purposes of this thesis is defined as: “a direction or approach which uses new 
or newly designed products or services to create a competitive advantage for the 
organisation”.  Strategy making is concerned with creating the direction or approach for the 
envisioned tomorrow based on the knowledge we have today, or living life forwards while 
understanding backwards33.  Understanding backwards does not mean that there is a focus 
only on the past, but refers to retrospective understanding:  we can only know what we know, 
once we have known it.  Knowledge resides not only at an individual but collectively, at an 
organisational level, forming part of the mental frames which the specialists and leaders of an 
organisation use to make sense of discontinuities in the flow of information.    Hedland 
                                                 
31  Strategy is variously defined as: ‘ a course of action aimed at ensuring that the organisation will 
achieve it’s objectives..’ (Certo & Peters, 1990) ; the overall plan for deploying resources to establish 
a favourable position’ (Grant, 2008) ; the pattern of decisions in a company that determines and 
reveals it’s objectives purposes, or goals…’ (Andrews, 1971);  ‘the creation of a unique and valued 
position, involving a different set of activities (Porter);  ‘working hard to understand a customer’s 
inherent needs and then rethinking what a category of product is all about’ (Ohmae, 1995); ‘a 
deliberate search for a plan of action that will develop a business’ competitive advantage and 
compound it’. (Porter, 1998);  ‘the deter-mination of the long-term goals and objectives of an 
enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary for carrying 
out those goals’ (Chandler, 1962).    
32  Gryskiewics (1999):  “.. in the 1950’s the typical business organization .. valued nothing so much as 
predictability and repeatability.. competition was non-existent..” 
33  Kierkegaard (1835) 
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suggests that one of the reasons that large western firms have innovation challenges is the 
inflexibility of their tightly codified and articulated knowledge systems, which force 
compliance to the organisational plan.  Ideologies associated with tightly codified knowledge 
systems create strong expectations of what should be found, in turn reducing the likelihood 
that weak signals will be noticed.  Tacit knowledge transfer is inhibited as a result, restricting 
the exploitation of knowledge resources.    
1.6  Weak Signals 
It is in making sense of the past, no matter how recent that past that the weak signals which 
can create competitive advantage are identified.   Failures of foresight in strategy: missing 
weak signals,  mean lost opportunities at best, or at worst,  lost competitive advantage.   Such 
failures are caused by bias, information load, expectation or seeing what is believed.  Beliefs 
play a substantial role in determining what is seen as beliefs are ingrained into people as 
expectations; which guide what is seen and understood.  Information load is a symptom of the 
turbulent world we inhabit, symptomized by complexity, ambiguity and the volume of 
information generated.   The volumes of information which the world is creating and storing 
are increasing exponentially34, creating a corresponding increase in the information that 
reaches every person.  Extracting meaningful information from the volumes of data is an 
increasingly complex task35.  Weak signals are often overlooked, as the abnormalities 
confronting people in organisations tend to be rationalised into existing frames.36   
                                                 
34  Every day the world generates 2.5 quintillion bytes of data.  This is so much data that 90% of the data 
in the world today has been created in the last two years alone. This data comes from everywhere: 
sensors used to gather climate information, posts to social media sites, digital pictures and videos, 
purchase transaction records, and cell phone GPS signals among others. http://www-
01.ibm.com/software/in/data/bigdata/ 
35  J Gantz, D Reinsel. (2011).  “ While 75% of the information in the digital universe is generated by 
individuals, enterprises have some liability for 80% of information in the digital universe at some 
point in its digital life….What are the forces behind the explosive growth of the digital universe? 
Certainly technology has helped by driving the cost of creating, capturing, managing, and storing 
information down to one-sixth of what it was in 2005. But the prime mover is financial….The trick is 
to generate value by extracting the right information from the digital universe — which, at the 
microcosmic level familiar to the average CIO, can seem as turbulent and unpredictable as the 
physical universe. 
36  Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) describe the concept of “normalization of abnormalities”, which describes 
the tendency to note a discontinuity but explain it away as normal, rather than focusing on the 
potential for disorder which the abnormality may create.  
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Being able to influence the manner in which people in organisations identify and amplify 
weak signals through the use of a structured approach to belief driven arguing should 
improve the ability of an organisation to exploit weak signals, adding value to the strategy 
making process.  The word strategy is derived from the ancient greek:  στρατηγία: stratēgia, 
meaning  “office of general, command, generalship”, στρατηγός : stratēgos, “the leader or 
commander of an army, a general”; στρατός stratos: “army” and ἄγω:  ago, “I lead, I 
conduct”.   Strategy making was originally directed at achieving superiority or advantage 
over opponents in military engagements or exercises.  Today business is a form of combat,  
but one in which the enemy or competitor is not necessarily known, making planning 
strategies difficult.  The business and economic world post the recovery from the global 
financial crisis has brought about changes which requires of business new approaches to 
strategy making37.  Strategy making takes place in the broader context of the world and the 
organisation, which is influenced by the turbulence external to the organisation.  It is the 
collective output of the leaders of the organisation; the social sensemakers and sensegivers, 
who filter the sense which is made through the lenses of their identities and beliefs.  
1.7  Language   
Organisations are ”networks of intersubjectively shared meanings38” which are maintained by 
the common language and social activities of the organisation.  The language of 
organisations, expressed as conversations, routines, texts and interdependent activities link 
people to one another in the execution of their organisational activities.  Conversation is only 
possible because as a species we have words which allow us to make sense of the world.  It is 
language and word-work39 which have set the human race apart from any other species, 
because these allow us to explain and structure our world.   Organisations have their own 
vocabularies, language structures and ideologies which become sensemaking resources for 
the people of that organisation.  People thus talk their organisations into existence, and talk 
changes into being.  The organisational culture is reflected in the language and thinking of the 
                                                 
37  R. Grant, (2008) and P Dicken (2011) both refer to the shareholder value approach as a catalyst for 
business failure.  Dicken cites the approach  as a key cause of the global economic crisis which began 
in 2008.  
38  Walsh and Ungson quoted in Weick (1995). 
39  Toni Morrison. Nobel Prize address 7 December 1993:  “Word-work is sublime, she thinks, because it 
is generative; it makes meaning that secures our difference, our human difference - the way in which 
we are like no other life”, quoted in Weick (1995) 
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organisation.  The richer the language of the organisation, the richer the reflective thought 
that is applied by the people within the organisation40, and the deeper and more meaningful 
the sense which can be made.  Interlocking routines are constructed from conversations and 
the language of an organisation, bundled together loosely as organising processes and 
habituated action patterns, enacted by aggregations of people “..who share many beliefs, 
values and assumptions that encourage them to make mutually-reinforcing interpretations of 
their own acts and the acts of others”41.    
1.8  Strategy as Sensemaking 
Strategy as a social process is a sensemaking process and therefore a subjective interpretive 
process whose outcome is dependent on the strategy makers, their identities, their beliefs and 
expectations, their personal frames of reference, the inter-relationships between them and the 
cues which are presented to them.   
Traditionally, strategy planning sessions have used linear methods to create understanding 
and set direction.  Participants in these strategy sessions often fail to notice or make sense of 
weak signals and a lack of consensus leads to misaligned or inappropriate strategies.   
Sensemaking starts with a sense maker, who because of his or her identity and beliefs, notices 
a surprise or event in the flow of events after it has happened, fitting it into his or her existing 
frames of reference to make sense.  A sensemaker is a complex composition of multiple 
identities based on experience, roles, learnings, perceptions and views, correct or not, of how 
others perceive the sensemaker.  These multiple identities of the sensemaker form the 
foundation of and influence the sense that is made.   Beliefs form the anchor for first noticing, 
then making sense of anything unknown or unexpected.  Reference points are created from 
the mental models or frames, vocabularies, ideologies, stories and knowledge assimilated 
over time; which then become beliefs colouring the sense that is made.   When unexpected 
cues are encountered, the stimuli of the unknown cues are placed into the existing frames of 
reference of the sensemaker to extract meaning.   
 
                                                 
40  Weick (1995) “…organizations with access to more varied images will engage in sensemaking that is 
more adaptive than will organizations with more limited vocabularies”  Thus requisite variety applies 
to language. 
41  Smirich and Stubbart (1985) 
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1.9  Belief Driven Sensemaking 
Belief driven sensemaking is manifested in expecting and arguing in organisations.   Strategic 
expectations or anticipation and articulation of outcomes are common-place and deliberate 
tools used by leaders to focus the minds of the people on the future, but their individual 
expectations colour the sense that is made.  Language forms part of the frames of reference, 
along with knowledge structures, rules, values, personal experiences and personal and 
organisational stories.    Expectations create self-fulfilling prophecies, and limit what is 
noticed.  Thus in order to believe what is seen, the strategy makers must not only be mindful 
of their own and the collectives, expectations, but also have sufficient trust in their fellow 
strategy makers to feel safe voicing contradictory or potentially disruptive ideas. 
Arguing in the sensemaking context is a belief driven process which can be directed to focus 
thinking,  surface weak signals from the data presented to strategy makers, and provide a 
platform for reasoned discourse to reinforce or change existing beliefs and expectations.  This 
thesis specifically considers arguing as a belief driven process of sensemaking, within the 
strategy making process.  If we define arguing in organisations as a social learning process 
which uses reasoned discourse to reinforce or change existing beliefs, and the process of 
arguing during strategy making as a method of identification of minority beliefs or weak 
signals within the strategy making process of the organisation, then we can expect to find the 
following: 
 That the successful arguers and noticers of weak signals will have a large number of 
identities on which they can draw to make sense. 
 That the process of arguing can be used to identify or highlight minority beliefs or 
weak signals which may be strategic opportunities. 
 That the process of arguing will align the thinking of the participants in the strategic 
process. 
 That a structured arguing process will result in clearer strategic goals 
 That the process of arguing will improve the modern strategy making process. 
The research contained within this thesis is conceptual.  No study exists which has 
undertaken such a conceptual analysis.  A literature review cannot provide sufficient depth to 
satisfy the research puzzle and therefore an interpretive conceptual analysis will be done.  
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The contribution that this research will make to the body of knowledge will be to provide 
insight into strategy making suited to organisations operating in dynamic, information rich, 
complex and ambiguous environments.  It will add the following value to the body of 
knowledge:   
 An understanding of how to better surface weak signals which could create strategic 
opportunity through arguing:   
 Guidance as to how to select those strategy makers who are most likely to notice 
potential value adding patterns, from within the organisation.  
 A methodology to structure arguing which meets the challenges of modern strategy 
making and which will provide a means to facilitate the identification of weak signals 
during the strategy making process. 
1.10 Purpose  
This thesis intends to provide a different approach to the identification of weak signals in the 
strategy making process.  Strategy is challenging as a research area as there is no generally 
accepted theory of strategy.  Scholars disagree regarding virtually all areas of strategy: there 
is no common definition of strategy; no definitive agreement regarding what strategy seeks to 
achieve; no agreement regarding where strategy making begins and ends; no consensus on 
who is responsible for strategy making; and limited agreement about the importance of 
having a strategy.  There is consensus however, that organisations which have developed 
strategies, particularly in turbulent environments, benefit from having and implementing the 
strategies.   
The extent of the turbulence which the business world is experiencing currently is greater 
than any previously experienced.  The volumes of information stored, access and analysed 
are increasing exponentially as more and more devices and people connect to the World Wide 
Web.   New information, new products, and new technologies are shared, sold and exchanged 
across the globe constantly.    Remaining competitive in this environment requires new ways 
to find new opportunity and new services.  Although strategic planning processes have been 
evolving along with the development of the business environment, there is a need for a more 
perceptive way to make strategy that will extract the weak signals that will enable business to 
keep a competitive edge.    
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Strategy making is a sensemaking process: a social cognitive process, heavily reliant on the 
knowledge and insight of individuals and teams, to create new knowledge which can become 
a competitive edge.  In the strategy making process, sensemaking is both retrospective42; and 
prospective43.  Retrospective as patterns are seen and understood in retrospect, and 
prospective as the knowledge and intuition of the sensemaker projects the sense that is made 
into a future world.   
A variety of viewpoints and approaches to strategy have been examined by scholars, and 
these will be considered briefly during the analysis.   The research will consider the strategic 
context:  the conditions under which the strategy makers make strategy,  centralised vs 
distributed strategy making, and strategic ‘planning’ sessions as meetings.    Meetings are the 
organisation ‘writ small’ and it is in meetings that leaders ‘give sense’ to others.  This 
sensegiving and the manner in which it is managed influences the manner of thinking that is 
applied and consequently, the sense that is made. 
Particular emphasis will be placed on the role of weak signals in the strategy making process, 
as leading indicators of disruptors or innovation for change:  these are critical in strategy 
making, particularly in turbulent times but often overlooked precisely because the strategy 
makers are overloaded and the signals are weak.    
Arguing as a belief driven sensemaking process enables people to make sense of minority 
views, and exposes weak signals which would otherwise be unnoticed.   
1.11 Design / Methodology  
This thesis conducts a conceptual analysis of the intersection between two areas of theory, 
namely the belief driven process of arguing within organisational sensemaking, and weak 
signal identification in strategy making.   In particular this thesis explores aspects of the 
belief driven sensemaking process of arguing as a means to identify and amplify the weak 
signals in the strategy making process.   Belief driven sensemaking is very applicable to the 
process of strategy making as it takes into account the identity of the sensemaker, and the 
impact of the quantity, variety, ambiguity and complexity of the information facing those 
who make strategy.   
                                                 
42  Weick (1995) 
43  Gioia and Mehra (1996).   
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 16 
The role of the multiple identities of sensemakers and the impact this has on expectations and 
arguing;  leader and stakeholder sensegiving in meetings;  trust relationships  among strategy 
makers,  and are examined in some detail as these are critical influences of the sense that is 
made.     
Chapter 1 summarises the context, purpose and design methodology of the thesis, and 
contextualises the research in organisational studies, and current global economic 
environment, which is relevant as the economic and business environments are interrelated 
and interdependent.  This chapter places in context the need for a new means to identify 
strategic opportunities in an evolving world of business.  
Chapter 2 examines the theory of Sensemaking in organisations.  The seven properties of 
sensemaking are explored, with particular emphasis on identity of the sensemaker as without 
a sensemaker there can be no sense made.   Belief driven approaches, and the use of arguing 
in organisations to create new knowledge, are considered in relation to the strategy making 
process.  The critical cognitive activities are the mindful identification of cues in the stream 
of information, without undue arousal.  Making sense of the weak signal information can then 
take place and potentially indicate challenges or opportunities: from this, all other strategy 
making activities follow.  Sensemaking is an individual cognitive activity, but sensemaking 
also takes place at multiple levels above the individual: at the levels of intersubjective; 
generic subjective and extrasubjective and the tensions that are created by interplays between 
these levels allow for the creation of new knowledge.  In organisations it is an activity which 
is driven by action: “how can I know what I think until I see what I say44”.  
Uncertainty is part of modern organisations, operating as they do between stability and chaos.  
At times of uncertainty the interplay between intersubjective and generic subjective allows 
for new paradigms45 to be emerge.    
The volume of information which strategists or managers should review or understand before 
developing a strategy is overwhelming.46  In order to deal with the information load, 
                                                 
44  Weick’s sensemaking ‘recipe’ 
45  Paradigms are ways of doing.  New paradigms then are created when tensions arise between 
innovation and controls:  people make sense and in so doing create new opportunities or new ways of 
doing.   
46  Ulwick (1999) estimated this volume to be in excess of 40 million potential solutions to any strategic 
problem.  
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important information contained in patterns of information which have weak signal 
information may be overlooked, ignored, or missed completely.  The mental steps which 
people take to deal with information load, pre-structures what they notice. Finding ways to 
alleviate stress or create conditions in which it becomes as positive influence would therefore 
add value.   
Chapter 3 will investigate the use of arguing as a belief driven process of sensemaking within 
the strategy making context.   Belief driven sensemaking is characterised by two context 
specific processes: Expecting and Arguing.  Beliefs in the form of expectation can influence 
what is noticed or the sense that is made from what is noticed.  The information which is 
noticed are the unexpected events, surprises or strange cues in the normal flow of 
information47.  When belief in the form of expectation is at play, what is noticed is often what 
was expected (believing is seeing), and can push aside weak signals.  Arguing is a way of 
making sense of what is noticed, as the process of arguing causes a reasoned debate.  Arguing 
is a cognitive and social process which naturally forms part of organisations48.   The 
usefulness of arguing within the organisational context lies in using a pre-existing social 
process to shift expectations or to rationalise intuitive thoughts, creating new knowledge.    
In particular this chapter explores intuition, emotion, and rationality, creative identities and 
meetings which are opportunities for arguing49.   Meetings are ‘the organization of the 
community writ small’, within which reality can be interrogated and expectations managed.  
The chapter will also explore the situations and social aspects which facilitate productive 
arguing, and the way in which people make sense during arguing in an organisational context.   
Identities in the arguing and sensegiving process will be explored to understand the dynamics 
created by sensegiving activities in a strategy making context. Team members as stakeholders 
of the strategy making process, and trust as a factor in productive meetings will also be 
explored.  
                                                 
47  Weick believes that in the efforts which people make to deal with information load, that the way in 
which the flow is interrupted is predictable, which implies that it also has the potential to be changed 
to focus their attention or create a cognitive moment.  
48  Weick (1995):  “meetings and arguments go together .. “meetings are sensemakers” 
49  Scott (2002) in noting the importance of conversations states that the world is changed one 
conversation at a time, and we should have the courage to have fierce conversations.   Fierce 
conversations according to Scott are those conversations in which we “.. come out from behind 
ourselves into the conversation and make it real..” 
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Chapter 4 explores strategy and weak signal identification.  The evolution of strategy as 
management discipline is investigated in order to understand why strategy evolves.   The 
context in which strategy takes place and the people whom make strategy are investigated to 
draw parallels to sensemaking.   Emergent strategy and strategic intent are then examined 
against a backdrop of strategic planning to understand applicability for modern organisations.  
The evolution of Weak signal identification and amplification will be explored in the context 
of minority and majority viewpoints of organisational arguing, to create new cognitions by 
shifting sensemaking frames.  Weak signals identifiable in the edge of chaos of complex 
adaptive systems, can be amplified through lifting reliance on the generic subjectivity that 
structures organisations and within the context of organisational arguing, creating temporary 
instability and dissonance within the safety of the arguing context.   The cognitions50 most 
likely to produce dissonance are those that provide information useful for action51, in a 
decision situation.  Decision situations are those where individuals have committed to an 
action and events occur or information is received that is inconsistent with the chosen course 
of action.   
Chapter 4 examines weak signal identification within the strategy making context.  It touches 
briefly on the schools of thought around strategy.  It considers the evolution of strategy 
making through global economic cycles in order to understand how strategy making has 
progressed in alignment with economic cycles, from a linear process, to a more dynamic and 
less structured approach.  This is relevant as business and management are in a process of 
constant evolution and constantly require new planning approaches.     
No generally accepted theory of strategy exists, therefore this chapter considers the context 
and content of strategy, the strategy makers, and takes particular cognisance of the people 
element of strategy: for it is the people in the organisation who create strategy, making sense 
through their words and language.   Team members are stakeholders to the strategy making 
process, and therefore are referred to as stakeholders throughout this document, rather than 
team members.  
                                                 
50  Cognition is any piece of knowledge a person may have.  These can include knowledge of behaviours, 
attitudes, states of the world, or more.  The more discrepant two cognitions are, the greater the 
magnitude of dissonance experienced. 
51  Cacioppo and Berntson (1994) 
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In particular this chapter will investigate emergent strategies and weak signals, probing how 
conditions for noticing weak signals within the edge of chaos of a complex adaptive 
system52may be optimised and incorporated into strategy making.   
Chapter 5 considers the research conducted and draws some conclusions. The findings note 
the impact of constant change and turbulence has had on organisations which face a constrant 
need to redefine themselves and discover new strategic opportunities.   Although the 
outcomes of the research are theoretical, some promising pointers are found for future 
empirical studies in this field.  Chapter 5 summarises the key findings and proposes a 
theoretical model for intuitive-rationalising in a strategy making environment.   
Key pointers found are a need for mindfulness and sensegiving as attributes needed for both 
the leader of a strategy making team and for the individual team members;  requisite variety 
in terms of multiple identities within stakeholders, when creating a strategy making team as a 
mix of those with broad experience with multiple identities, those with deep experience and 
limited identities as well as those who with creative identities who operate on the periphery 
of the organisation are needed;  the need for freedom to apply intuitive and creative thinking 
in an environment of trust is highlighted as important for without freedom to be intuitive and 
a platform in which the stakeholders feel safe, weak signals will not be articulated.  The 
findings note that the identification of weak signals is an intuitive process which uses tacit 
knowledge to notice subtle patterns but this by itself is insufficient, as it only identifies and 
does not amplify the weak signals.  A narrative process of story-telling within the team is 
proposed to articulate the weak signals identified, which is followed by rational debate 
among the team to amplify these weak signals, and change or create new expectations, thus 
locating structured arguing,  within the strategy making process and developing a theoretical 
model of strategy sensemaking.   
                                                 
52  Dyer-Harris. Zeisler (2002) 
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Chapter 2 
Sensemaking 
 
‘be where you are with all your mind’  
(A sign on the wall of a machine shop run by the New York Central Railroad) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
We live in a socially created world, a world in which people constrain and structure their 
actions and viewpoints in order to organise their world.    Making sense of what happens in 
this world is a process which is, as Weick notes: ‘grounded in both individual and social 
activity..’ where it is used to cope with the surprises in a flow of events. Sensemaking is, 
quite literally the making of sense, or the organising of thoughts and reactions about a 
particular event, based on the individual and his or her past experiences, identities and 
expectations.    
Making sense is an ongoing and completely natural activity which individuals use to 
understand the unexpected.  It is about being aware, taking notice and attaching meaning to 
events, and structuring a view of the unknowns in organisational reality that is plausible and 
intelligible to the individual.  By fitting observed events or unknown cues into existing 
frames of reference or belief systems:  people make sense.   
As Langer noted, “we experience the world by creating categories and making distinctions 
between them”.  Without the categories and subsequent distinction finding we may miss 
much of what goes on in the world.   
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Organisational sensemaking53 refers to the way in which people collectively make plausible 
sense of the unknown events which they experience during the flow of organisational life.  It 
is concerned with extracting important information from the streams of information flowing 
past; structuring the unknown, and fitting the new information into existing frames or mental 
models in a plausible way or story54, in many ways similar to the strategy making process, as 
strategy can be seen as multi-contextual sensemaking under conditions of high ambiguity and 
uncertainty.   Individuals who work in teams, make and hold collective knowledge, but the 
application of intersubjective meaning and understanding is continuously co-created in a 
sensemaking system which changes I into We.  In a strategy making context, ‘we’ can 
become group think55 and should be carefully excluded. The ability to make sense of a 
constantly changing and complex environment has become an important activity for leaders 
today.   
The most fully developed of the categories we use to make sense, are ideologies: the systems 
of ideas that we use to rationalise and justify decisions. In organizational sensemaking 
ideologies, third order controls, paradigms, theories of action, traditions or stories create 
vocabularies of meaning for the organisation.  Ideology or shared belief systems are 
important sensemaking resources as they have powerful emotional undertones that bind 
people.  Particularly relevant to this research is the concept56 that making strategy is like 
creating ideology although only if the strategy is powerfully shared throughout the 
organisation in an ideological manner, with tight control over core values.  Ideologies can 
create harmony, self-control and co-operation.   People select from a variety of these 
vocabularies of meaning or frames when they make sense.  The frames they select are used to 
                                                 
53  "It is not interpretation as it encompasses more than how cues, information is inter-preted, but is 
concerned with how the cues were internalized in the first instance and how individuals decide to 
focus on specific cues. (Weick 1995) "Identity construction is seen by many to be one of the two basic 
properties that differentiate sensemaking from basic cognitive psychology […]. The other property is 
the use of plausibility as the fundamental criterion of sensemaking." (Weick et al. 2001, p. 416) 
54  Weick (1995): If accuracy is nice but not necessary in sensemaking, then what is necessary?  The 
answer is something that preserves plausibility and coherence, something that is reasonable and 
memorable that embodies past experience and expectations, something that resonates with other 
people, something that can be constructed retrospectively but also can be used prospectively, 
something that captures both feeling and thought, something that allows for embellishment to fit 
current oddities, something that is fun to construct.  In short what is necessary in sensemaking is a 
good story” 
55  A tendency in groups in which the desire for conformity or harmony results in poor decision making. 
56  Westley (1990), quoted in Weick (1995) 
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categorise, show or hide data, and colour the sense that is made.    
Cues are present moments of experience taken from the flows of life.  When a cue or surprise 
event occurs, a fit for the cue is searched for among the frames to which the sensemaker has 
access.  Recognition takes place when a cue is fitted to a frame to create a meaningful 
definition of the event.  Where the sensemakers’ frames are lacking in suitable experiences, 
finding meaning can take time, increasing the autonomic arousal or emotional reaction until a 
match is found.   
Third order controls, or premise controls are those shadow systems in organisations which 
give structure and create order through assumptions, and definitions that are taken as a 
‘given’.  Premise controls come into play early in the sensemaking process and influence the 
sense that is made through all subsequent steps.  Particularly near the top of an organisation, 
where work is non-routine, non-standardised, nor regulated, premise controls are more 
prevalent.  This occurs as leaders are more likely to work under conditions of information 
load, high ambiguity and high arousal, and fall back onto premises from their experience 
when making sense.   
Paradigms in organisations are those standard operating procedures, or shared definitions of 
the environment; the agreed upon systems of power and authority, and how these inter-
operate.  The more developed the paradigm, the stronger the consensus regarding connections 
and technological certainty.   Paradigms are transmitted in discrete artefacts rather than in 
coherent formulations and therefore are subject to interpretation.  The importance for strategy 
making is that when paradigm changes takes place, these produce weak signals initially 
which should be the trigger for a strategic sensemaking  process.    
Theories of action are filtering and interpretation systems within organisations, used to 
supervise the identification of cues and crafting of responses to the cues.  Theories of action 
are behavioural coping mechanisms, building on stimulus-responses learned in organisations.  
They are important for strategy making as they appear in statements about implications, if-
then assertions, and means-ends thoughts, and can potentially filter what is noticed. 
Organisational traditions are the vocabularies of repeated actions recorded and handed down 
from one organisational generation to the next.   Traditions determine what will be retained, 
and become encultured in organisations as patterns that guide action taking, ends to be 
achieved and the associated structures.   Traditions are transmitted in stories by story-tellers, 
and importantly:  new traditions are also created by story-telling. 
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Organisations are built around models of argumentation, yet organisational communication 
takes place in narrative form.  People are constrained and handicapped by this dichotomy.  
Stories are the way people make the unexpected expectable, guiding future conduct.  The 
interesting thing about stories is that they create a retrospective filtered and linear coherence 
from occurrences which at the time they took place, took place in a dynamic and chaotic 
form57.     
2.2  The Role of Identity in Sensemaking 
Although Weick initially allocated equal importance to the seven properties of sensemaking 
which he identified, he has since noted that identity is central58 and is the lens through which 
the other 6 properties are interpreted, for without the sensemaker, there can be no 
sensemaking.  “The trap is that the sensemaker is singular and no individual ever acts like a 
single sensemaker.”59    Although this may seem to lead to schizophrenia, the “more selves I 
have access to, the more meanings I should be able to extract and impose in any situation,” 
and “the less the likelihood that I will every find myself surprised”60   
Sensemaking begins with the identity of the sense-maker, whose sense of self is continuously 
redefined, during retrospective internal narratives and processes of interaction61 with others.  
The more selves the sensemaker has access to, the more meanings can be extracted and 
imposed onto a situation62.    
                                                 
57  Stories provide a sequence to events that was not clear at the time the events took place.  The 
sequencing becomes a heuristic for sensemaking and even sensegiving – providing a means to 
understand what occurred, and to link these events to the current situation.     
58  Weick, Sutcliffe, Obstfeldt (1999): “Viewed as a significant process of organizing, sensemaking 
unfolds as a sequence in which people concerned with identity in the social context of other actors 
engage ongoing circumstances from which they extract cues and make plausible sense retrospectively, 
while enacting more or less order into those ongoing circumstances.” 
59  Weick (1995) 
60  Weick (1995) 
61  Erez and Earley quoted in Weick (1995) refer to three self-derived needs which drive the development 
and maintenance of a person’s changing sense of self: ..” 1) the need for self-enhancement, as 
reflected in seeking and maintaining a positive cognitive and affective state about the self; 2) the self-
efficacy motive, which is the desire to perceive oneself as competent and efficacious; and 3) the need 
fo self-consistency, which is the desire to sense and experience coherence and continuity. 
62  Sluss and Ashforth (2007) have provided a view of three levels of identity:  The individual identity  in 
which the individual has a self identity,in which the individuals own skills, goals, traits and 
performance are operational. At this level motivation is self-interest.  At an interpersonal level, 
relational identity becomes important : how the individual interacts with supervisors or subordinates, 
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Identities, frames of reference or multiple selves do not exist at birth but are constructed and 
reconstructed over a lifetime, based on our upbringing, experiences and relationships.  
Identity is thus in a state of constant redefinition, as we adapt our learnings to new roles, new 
people, or new organisational states, giving rise to a shifting concept of self63, which derives 
from our needs for self-enhancement, self-efficacy and self-consistency. The individual uses 
cues presented by the situation in which s/he finds him or herself, to determine which identity 
suits the situation.  Identity or self operates at three different levels:  the individual level 
which is primarily focused on oneself as a unique person, the interpersonal level which is 
focused on role related issues and the collective self which focuses on membership of teams 
or groups.64 
Work context is an important source of identities, through the meaning of work65”, which 
includes the job title, content, the views others hold of the job, relationships and the 
significance of the work performed.  Weick (1995), in his description of the strategy making 
environment at Hawick refers to identity development as a root act of sensemaking.  In the 
process of understanding themselves the dominant questions for the strategists at Hawick 
were: ‘who am I,’ ‘who are they,’ and ‘who are we.’   Identity is “a person’s sense of 
distinctiveness about who he or she is in a setting;  the relationships he or she has in that 
setting; the collective and what threat to this sense of self the setting contains; what is 
available to enhance, continue, and render efficacious that sense of who one is:  all providing 
a centre from which judgements of relevance and sense fan out”66.  A source of meaning67 is 
                                                                                                                                                        
and co-workers. Self esteem is derived from the interactions with others, and motivation is provided 
by fulfilling ones obligations to the relationship.  At the collective level, individuals have a collective 
identity which is on oneself as a member of a group, team or organisation.  Self esteem in the 
collective is derived from intergroup comparatives. Motivation is the welfare of the collective. 
64  “typified discursive construction” Knorr-Cetina, (1981) as quoted in Weick (1995) 
65 Sluss & Ashforth (2007): “.. the individual level focuses on oneself as a unique being, and self-esteem 
derives from interpersonal comparisons of traits, abilities, goals, performance, and the like. The basic 
motivation is self-interest, and the individual is essentially independent and autonomous.  The 
interpersonal level focuses on one’s role related relationships (henceforth “role-relationships”),such as 
supervisor-subordinate and co-worker-coworker. Individuals are therefore interdependent…The basic 
motivation is the dyad’s welfare, and selfesteem derives from fulfilling one’s role-relationship 
obligations.  Finally, the collective level is the province of social identity theory… the focus is on 
oneself as a prototypical member of a group, such as an organization, or a social category, such as 
gender. Selfesteem derives from intergroup comparisons, and the basic motivation is the welfare of the 
collective, placing a premium on common fate, cohesion, and group norms..” 
65  C.G. Jung “You are what you do” 
66  Weick (2001) 
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provided by identity which is reflective of the person’s experiences, values, thoughts, 
emotions and the context of work and social roles.  The self is relational: relational identities 
are formed based on inter-personal relationships with others.  Collective identities are those 
identities linked to achievement in a joint goal setting environment – such as a team 
environment68. 
The sensemaker is an individual, but also a collective, the parliament of selves, making sense 
of events that take place in that social setting: the organisation, based on his or her personal 
selves.  Clues for identity are sourced from the conduct of others, and the perceived view 
which others have of the self.  The self which is perceived by individuals is a shifting 
concept69, derived from the need for self-enhancement, self-efficacy and self-consistency.    
The individual is constantly shaped and altered by his/her belief of the views of others of the 
organisation, and by new learnings.  Individuals act as representatives of the organisation 
they serve, projecting the identities which they believe to be important onto the organisation 
and observing the consequences70.   Narratives of identity are told and retold to themselves 
through silent dialogue, and to others through story-telling.   These reflexive autobiographical 
stories are used by people in organisations to develop their identities and to test these against 
the views of others in the organisation, learning about themselves and others in the process.   
Identity is used to reduce anxiety, as it provides a structure to which to attach mental models 
for framing against cues or surprise and becomes a source of meaning to individuals.  The 
development of personal identity can support or undermine performance and motivation in an 
organisation.   Identity is thus in a state of constant redefinition, as people adapt learnings to 
new roles, new people, or new organisational states.  Individuals constantly seek occasions to 
compose and confirm the meaning of their job, their roles and their selves71, expanding the 
                                                                                                                                                        
67    Sommer and Baumeister as quoted in Reissner (2010) distinguish four different needs for meaning, 
which affect a person’s identities:  purpose of their current actions in relation to the future; efficacy 
and control over the outcomes of their actions; value and justification of their self; self worth, i.e. 
establishing a picture that they are worthy individuals.   
68  Van der Zee et al (2009): “ A collective identity orientation refers to a conception of the self in terms 
of being a group member and in terms of characteristics that are connected to the group. On the basis 
of social identity theory and the similarity-attraction hypothesis, it can be predicted that a collective 
orientation goes along with assimilation of the self to the ingroup and differentiation to outgroups”.  
69  “typified discursive construction” Knorr-Cetina, (1981) as quoted in Weick (1995) 
70  Ring & Van de Ven, (1989) as quoted in Weick, (1995) 
71  Wrzesniewski, Dutton, and Debebe, (2003) 
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identities which they can access.   Creative people in the work environment,  are responsible 
for the innovation that takes place.  Their profession more than their organisation, as well as 
the work itself and their achievements in that work, are important sources of identity for 
creative people72.   
Creative personal identity73 is a further development of the self-definition, formed from past 
experience and formative opportunities to engage in creativity.  Individuals with a creative 
self-identity will undertake everything creatively as creativity is a fundamental part of his or 
her self-definition.   Creativity and problem solving are closely linked, with analogical 
problem solving playing an important role in divergent thinking.  The linking of seemingly 
unrelated information during problem solving has been found to cause a deeper review of 
underlying schema of the problem structure, which resulted in higher quality problem 
solutions. 
The broader the experience base of the individual, the more selves the individual can access, 
and the less affected the individual is by surprises.   Diverse work experience not only 
broadens the experience base of the individual, but adds more selves which the individual can 
access.  The greater the number of selves the individual has access to, the better the 
individual can deal with surprises, and the less affected he or she is by surprises.   Ashby’s 
Law74 applied to identities in sensemaking implies that where multiple identities or selves 
exist based on personal experience, history, fears, aspirations, roles and group memberships 
(particularly when these do not overlap), the sensemaker has a greater degree of control of the 
sensemaking in that he or she has access to more selves to use to cope with the sensemaking 
event.   This requisite variety can disappear under conditions of stress75 when first 
interruption in the form of stress, and then arousal occurs, interfering with cognitive activity.   
At a strategic level, making sense is a critical activity, as missing a weak signal or cue, can 
lead to missed opportunities, and loss of competitive advantage. Change and disruption 
                                                 
73 Jaussi et al (2007) note that:  “creative personal identity is comprised of the overall importance a 
person places on creativity in general as part of his or her self-definition… an individual with a high 
creative personality will be driven to do everything creatively, not just the job, because creativity is 
fundamental to his or her self-definition..” 
73  Jaussi, et al 2007 
74  Or the Law of Requisite Variety:  "the variety in the control system must be equal to or larger than the 
variety of the perturbations in order to achieve control" 
75  Weick (1990) 
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happen regularly in organisations, and are experienced as surprises to the expected flow of 
events.  In reaction, people use the seven related properties of sensemaking76 to make sense 
within their environment.   
Sensemaking in an organizational sense is a critical activity as the social constructs of an 
organisation are created through shared meanings.  Managers or leaders are more able to cope 
with surprises when they have a broader experience base, supporting Weick’s view that 
generalists are better able to cope with information load.  At the level at which strategic 
thinking takes place, the non-routine-ness, incomprehensible and complex information load 
that is the nature of work at this level, increases the demand for sensemaking.  This also 
implies that leaders who have broad experience are more likely to be able to cope with 
surprises as they have access to more selves, have a greater variety of beliefs and thus would 
be better able to see situations more fully, match cues to their internal frames and determine a 
greater variety of solutions.  “Thus, identities specify relationships that are central to the 
social nature of sensemaking among diverse actors77”.   
The relationship between stress and performance in an individual is curvilinear, but in a 
group the relationship is more linear in that increases in stress lead to performance increases 
not decreases78.  
The determination of who we are as individuals and as organisations, is a decision process79  
because the value which we deduce is extracted from decisions we see and make.  Individuals 
who make no decisions therefore have very poorly constructed selves.  People can only know 
what they have done, after they have done it, and they only know who they are after they 
have received feedback.  Thus identities and meaning are constructed in retrospect.    
Personal success plays a role in what leaders notice as it can lead to complacency:  ‘success 
                                                 
76  Weick (1995):  1. Grounded in identity construction, 2. Retrospective, 3. Enactive of sensible 
environments, 4. Social, 5. Ongoing, 6. Focused on and by extracted cues, 7. Driven by plausibility 
rather than accuracy.   
77  Weber & Glynn (2006) 
78  Lowe and McGrath quoted in Weick (1990).  Weick goes on to note that this increase in performance 
is dependent on the individuals coalescing as a team which displays distinctive functional 
relationships.   
79  Brickman, (1987) as quoted in Weick, (1995) 
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narrows perceptions80, changes attitudes, feeds confidence in a single way of doing business, 
breeds over-confidence in the efficacy of current abilities and practices and makes leaders 
intolerant of opposing points of view’81   This in turn increases the likelihood that unexpected 
events will be undetected leading to bigger problems.     
2.3 Retrospective Versus Prospective Sensemaking  
The retrospective nature of sensemaking means that sense is not made until the event or 
surprise has occurred.   
“People make sense of things by seeing a world on which they already imposed what they believe. In 
otherwords, people discover their own inventions. This is why sensemaking can be understood as invention and 
interpretations understood as discovery. These are complementary ideas. If sensemaking is viewed as an act of 
invention, then it is also possible to argue that the artefacts it produces include language games and texts82”. 
Any object perceived is history from the moment we perceive it, making retrospection or 
history an integral part of our daily lives.  Our memories whether of a year, or years past, or 
even that of a split second, are the realities with which we live.  Even a conceptualisation, 
dealing with a future reality, becomes a memory, the moment we conceive or conceptualise 
it.  Memory is subject to bias, and particularly to the effects of dissonance which can create 
biased misrecall83.   Hindsight bias can be at play when we make sense as we are subject to 
our belief system, that which we ‘know’ and apply to sensemaking events in the form of a 
conversation with our selves.   
Finding meaning is a process of attention to that which has already taken place with all of the 
bias and hindsight that memory brings. Individual sensemakers within an organisation use 
multiple vocabularies to filter their sensemaking but as Weick notes:  “words approximate the 
territory; they never map it perfectly. That is why sensemaking never stops.”   
People do not know that there is a surprise event until they have noticed it in the expected 
flow and by the time they notice, it is in the past.  When no match to existing frames can be 
found, arousal occurs and continues to increase until a suitable frame is found or learnings are 
                                                 
80  Westrum (1982): The fallacy of centrality in which people believe “If something was happening I 
would know about it. I do not know about it therefore it cannot be happening”   
81  Weick, Sutcliffe, Obstfeld (1999).  
82  Weick, (1995) 
83  Harmon-Jones & Mills (1999) 
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assimilated, which will allow the making of sense.    
Sensemaking is also a prospective process as the sense made retrospectively is applied to 
future sensemaking.  When counterfactual reasoning is at play: finding a different outcome 
for the past, prospective sensemaking is taking place.  Prospective sensemaking involves acts 
of exploration and interpretation with a forward looking view, as it cultivates strategic 
foresight through scenarios.  It is both an attitudinal and a task response.  Gioia’s (2002) view 
of strategy making as prospective sensemaking is that it is an activity which requires an 
ability to envision the future as if it had already occurred.   
Strategic foresight as the deep insight found in vagueness;  was seen by Henry Fayol as a 
important function of the executive.   
2.4 Ongoing  
Sensemaking is ongoing:  it has no beginning and there is no end as people are always in the 
middle of something.  It takes place constantly as people extract cues from the flows of 
organisational life, where they are always in the midst of flows of projects, problems, 
solutions, other people and choices.  Everyday life puts people into situations of 
“thrownness”84 where they are thrown into ongoing situations; situations in which they need 
to make do in order to make sense.  Cues or interruptions to the expected flows of events 
induce an emotional response in the autonomic nervous system, and arousal occurs which in 
turn triggers an act of sensemaking.  Arousal develops slowly and often 2 - 3 seconds after 
the interruption has occurred.  Once noticed, people try to link the noticed cue to their 
established frameworks of reference.   Until such time as the flow of events is restored or a 
substitute response found which allows the sequence to be completed, the autonomic arousal 
will continue to increase.  If there are many ways in which the sequence can be completed, 
                                                 
84  Thrownness is described as having six properties:   Winograd and Flores in Weick (1986):   1. You 
cannot avoid acting: your actions affect the situation and yourself, often against your will. 2. You 
cannot step back and reflect on your actions: You are thrown on your intuitions and you have to deal 
with whatever comes up as it comes up. 3. The effects of action cannot be predicted: The dynamic 
nature of social conduct precludes accurate prediction. 4. You do not have a stable representation of 
the situation: Patterns may be evident after the fact, but at the time the flow unfold there is nothing but 
arbitrary fragments capable of being organized into a host of different patterns or possibly no pattern 
whatsoever. 5. Every representation is an interpretation: There is no way to settle that any 
interpretation is right or wrong, which means an “Objective analysis” of that  into which one was 
throw, is impossible.  6. Language is action: Whenever people say something, they create rather than 
describe a situation, which means it is impossible to stay detached from whatever emerges unless you 
say nothing, which is such a strange way to react that the situation is deflected anyway..  
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then arousal does not build very much, suggesting that generalists or those with many 
identities, and people who are able to improvise, are less likely to experience an emotional 
response to an interruption.  At an executive management level, this is important to note in 
terms of the composition of strategy making teams.   
The emotional response which takes place is very often a negative emotion because 
interruptions to an expected flow in an organisation are generally perceived as a detrimental 
event.  Tight coupled organisational structures are more ‘interruptible’ that those which are 
loosely coupled, as expectations are higher.   Positive emotional responses occur when there 
is a removal of a interrupting stimulus or events which accelerate completion of a plan or the 
achievement of a goal.   
Individual sensemakers within an organisation use multiple vocabularies to filter their 
sensemaking but as Weick notes:  “words approximate the territory; they never map it 
perfectly. That is why sensemaking never stops.”  Sensemaking in an organizational sense is 
a critical activity as the social constructs of an organisation are created through shared 
meanings.   
2.5  Enactive of Sensible Environments 
Organisations are not stable, but rather seek to create stability through the perceived order: 
the sensibility of operating rules, routines, policies, and other habituated practices.  Sense is 
created when people use words to crystalise the smoke of organisational life into temporary 
meaning which is believed when it is seen.  Stability makes systems less responsive to change 
and is therefore dangerous as systems in a state of equilibrium can face extinction. 
“Organisation is a set of procedures for argumentation and interpretation as well as for 
solving problems and making decisions”85.  People talk organisations into being by 
preserving portions of smoke-like conversations into crystal-like86 texts to organise their 
everyday lives.  Thus people create their environments, by their actions, and the 
environments in turn create the people they contain:  autopoesis is at play in organisations.       
More than that, this is an ongoing creative process of ‘relatings’,  which means that people’s 
activities are caused by the stimulus of the situation but also the activity itself helped to 
produce the situation.  Managers are very much part of the organisational environment, and 
                                                 
85  Cohen, March and Olsen (1972), quoted in Weick, (1995) 
86  Taylor and Van Every, (2000) as quoted in Weick (1995) 
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managers take action when they manage, creating the environment.    Actions are anchored in 
individual belief systems, and found in the ideologies, cultures, scripts and traditions of the 
organisation.  Therefore the manager will find what he or she expected to find, or believe 
what he or she is seeing, and in order to change what is seen, one must first change his or her 
beliefs.  Social forces of organisations are therefore created by the people within the 
organisation because they act in a manner that implies that the social forces exist.    By taking 
such actions they create both the social problems and the solutions which face them in an 
organisational environment.      
Language crystalises the actions which are taken, into conversations, or texts.   In Weick’s 
terms ‘believing is seeing’ or what is seen is interpreted through the lens of the belief system 
of the self whom we have selected to deal with the sensemaking event.   Each manager in an 
organisation makes sense of an organisational event and assigns meaning to it from his or 
own viewpoint, which will oscillate over time.   Although each manager makes his or her 
own sense of events, these are influenced by the identity which the manager uses to frame the 
sense that is made.   
2.6 Social  
Human activities and thinking are social cognitive activities which are made possible by 
language:  as “….our days in organizations are days of communicating..”87  Language uses 
words in a structured way to communicate the sense that is made.  Thus, words matter as they 
are used to delineate and describe the sense that is being made.  Words are the vehicles 
which, when combined into coherent sentences, enable people to make sense.  The words 
which people choose are reflective and selective of their reality, their beliefs, their past, their 
judgement systems  and their present.   Words are expressive of reality, but also constrain that 
reality, or fail to express it fully, rather creating a plausible view of the reality88:   “How can 
we know what we think until we see what we say”.     
Conversations between individuals, composed of sentences and words create the connections 
through which information is shared and people find direction. The vocabularies used 
embody the organisation they belong to, their profession and long established traditions. 
Managers or leaders are the authors and sensegivers in organisations, initiating and driving 
                                                 
87  Mills (2002) 
88  Weick calls it slippage; the gap between words and what they refer to. 
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conversations held in organisations about decisions.   Decisions in organisations are made 
either with others or with the knowledge that others will need to approve, understand or apply 
the decision89.  Strategic leaders share their decisions by communicating powerful visions.   
Sensegiving is the abstracting process which they use to simplify and present this 
information, thereby influencing the sense that is made by their followers.    
The need for sensemaking increases when information load, which is a  mixture of the  
quantity of information, level of  ambiguity and variety; or complexity increases90.  As Boisot 
notes:  “The major transformation in the strategic environment which strategy must deal with 
… can be summed up in a single word: turbulence.91”  Strategic leaders select coping 
mechanisms to deal with information load and these mechanisms lead executives to select 
solutions which match their belief systems, making them the authors of conversations, of 
texts and of visions and the designer of roadmaps to the visions.  As the load increases, the 
steps which people take to manage it increases in strength.  Strategic leaders therefore seldom 
produce accuracy, as the high levels of non-routine-ness, incomprehensibility and complexity 
of the information load which strategic leaders face, increases the coping mechanisms which 
they apply to cope with the information load.   
When we become aware of the process of making sense we become mindful: paying more 
attention to context and to variability.  Noticing what is important means improved attention:  
being more mindful of what is taking place in the stream of events.  Noticing patterns or 
opportunities relies on the sensemaking abilities among the leaders or their stakeholders.    
Although Weick comments that accuracy is not important and that plausibility is what is 
acceptable in business, plausibility may not bring the next competitive advantage.  Mindful 
attention:  noticing what is important, brings a different level of sensemaking to business.   
2.7 Focused on and by Extracted Cues 
Sensemaking takes place when an interruption to the organisational flow is noticed, and the 
                                                 
89  Weick (1985): “Organisational environments consist of nothing more than talk, symbols, promises, 
lies, interest, attention, threats, agreements, expectations, memories, rumours, indicators, supporters, 
detractors, faith, suspicion, trust, appearance,,… induce stable connections, bind people, signify 
important information..” 
90  Mintzberg et al (2005).. “strategic planning rises in importance in turbulent/uncertain times..” 
91  Boisot, in Garratt (2003), Preparing for Turbulence: the changing relationship between strategy and 
management development in the learning organization, in Developing strategic thought: A collection 
of the best thinking on business strategy, edited by Bob Garratt, Profile Books Ltd, London 
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cue or interruption that is noticed is applied against the frame of reference of the sensemaker 
to interpret the cue.   Noticing is the process of filtering, classifying and comparing the cue 
against what was expected.  Sensemaking is the subtler process of interpreting the 
interdependencies against the belief system.  The indexicality92 of a cue matters as the context 
of the cue is meaningful.  Past experiences which form the frames against which the cue is 
measured, colour the sense that is made.  In any organisation, the social context of the sense 
that is made is important as the social nature of sensemaking ties people to intended action, 
creates shared expectations and norms and affects the prominence of information.    The 
concept of the collective mind, developed to explain the performance of organisations in 
those situations requiring high reliability, explains heedful thinking and actions in these 
situations 
2.8 Plausibility  
Decision makers are sensemakers, particularly those who are at a senior level.  Leaders are 
most often tasked with strategy making, yet these same decision makers are subject to 
information load.  Their attempts to make sense occur under conditions of high arousal and 
high ambiguity because of the application of first and second order controls at the lower 
levels, and their focus is applied to wrong signals (novel indicators are ignored), making 
sensemaking relevant in the strategy making process; as surprises in this context are those 
patterns or differences which could constitute weak signals.  Actions and beliefs both 
regularise sensemaking.  People take action to make sense and make sense because of their 
beliefs93.  Any sensemaking that takes places does so because of what people have done.  In 
an organisational setting it is about people interacting to share beliefs and make sense that is 
acceptable to all.   
What is necessary when we make sense is a good story.  Faith in the extracted cues, and their 
sustained use as a reference point, or the plausibility of the explanation that is made when an 
interruption is found are what make the sensemaking real.      Enactment follows faith, as  
“..leadership lies in large part in generating a point of reference against which a feeling of 
organization and direction can emerge.”94   Language is the medium of sensemaking.  It is 
                                                 
92  Indexicality refers to the context or circumstances in which the cue is located.  
93  Taking action is similar to shining a flashlight on a field in the dark: it illuminates but only in the 
circle of light.  
94  Smircich and Morgan (1982) as quoted in Weick (1995) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 34 
used to identify, categorise and structure memories into plausible stories.  These stories use 
vocabularies as a lens to sharpen the view of the sense that is made.  
2.9 High Reliability Organisations  
Research performed on sensemaking in high reliability organisations has shown higher levels 
of mindfulness in these organisations.  Mindfulness95 is an enhanced attention to context as 
well as variability96 a state where people have a rich awareness of detail, an openness to 
novelty, and are better able to notice that which is unexpected.   Mindfulness is important as 
it determines the way in which we take in and use information to make sense.    
In his analysis of the Mann Gulch fires and the Tenerife Plane crash,  Weick has shown that 
small separate failures of sensemaking can lead to a major disaster, which in a business 
context can lead to financial or reputational failures.  When an organisation makes constant 
sense of what is taking place, such as the high reliability organisations investigated by Weick 
and Sutcliffe97, then sensemaking leads to mindfulness and a better ability to sense the 
unexpected.      
In an organisational strategy making context, a better ability to sense the unexpected, and an 
open-minded approach to discomforting information will enable the identification of new 
opportunities or strategies. Heedful interrelating in which people create mindful action is the 
process  
2.10 Leaders as Sensegivers  
A strong connection can be made between narrative analysis98 and sensemaking in the social 
construction of meaning.  The stories generated by sensemaking can cause the social 
structures in organisations to form and reform, leading to shifts in relationships and social 
                                                 
95  According to Weick, mindfulness is when we realize our current expectations, continuously improve 
those expectations based on new experiences, and implement those expectations to improve the 
current situation into a better one 
96  Langer, (11989):  “Mindfulness is a state of conscious awareness in which the individual is implicitly 
aware of the context and content of information. It is a state of openness to novelty in which the 
individual actively constructs categories and distinctions. In contrast, mindlessness is a state of mind 
characterized by an overreliance on categories and distinctions drawn in the past and in which the 
individual is context-dependent and, as such, is oblivious to novel (or simply alternative) aspects of 
the situation.” 
97  Weick, Sutcliffe,(2007) 
98  Narratives attempt to explain through words the personal experiences and relationships which exist 
between the experiences of the individual and their social framework. 
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roles in organisations.  
Senior managers or leaders, who are responsible for strategy making are both sensemakers 
and sensegivers.  The manner in which leaders approach sensegiving is important:  high 
levels of formal leadership sensegiving without participative stakeholder sensegiving leads to 
very controlled processes which restrict flows of information.99  When high levels of leader 
sensegiving is combined with participative stakeholder sensegiving, the result is intense and 
emergent actions, rich information flows and ongoing sensemaking. 
A central function of leadership is giving meaning to followers, particularly under conditions 
of uncertainty, or where the environment is complex with divergent stakeholder interests.   
Maitlis and Lawrence (2007) support Weick’s (1995) view that found that triggers for leader 
sensegiving, were complex sensemaking environments which contained issues perceived as 
ambiguous, unpredictable and involving numerous stakeholders.   This supports the view of 
strategy as a multi-contextual sensemaking opportunity.   
Stakeholder sensegiving is associated with perceptions of importance of the issue, or with 
perceptions of lack of leader expertise related to the issue.  Where stakeholders have high 
levels of relevant expertise and legitimacy in terms of formal authority or responsibility, they 
are more likely to engage in sensegiving100.   
2.11 Mindfulness 
Mindfulness is both an eastern and a western concept, implying a cognitive awareness of 
discriminatory detail, which is coupled with wise action.  Weick and Sutcliffe’s work in high 
reliability organisations has identified mindfulness101: “…the combination of ongoing 
scrutiny of existing expectations, continuous refinement and differentiation of expectations 
based on newer experiences, willingness and capability to invent new expectations that make 
sense of unprecedented events, a more nuanced appreciation of context and ways to deal with 
it, and identification of new dimensions of context that improve foresight and current 
functioning” as an important means to improve attention.   Mindfulness in Buddhist culture 
                                                 
99  Maitlis, (2005), defined stakeholders as participants in the strategy sessions.  Very controlled leader 
sensegiving in these sessions restricted the sense that was made 
100  Maitlis and Lawrence. (2007).  The researchers list a third condition that enables stakeholder 
sensegiving: opportunity to engage in such behavior.  While relevant, this has not been further 
considered in this research as strategy sessions do provide an opportunity for stakeholders to engage.  
101  Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) 
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means ‘not wobbling’ or wavering from the object, or ensuring focus on the discrepancy.   
Mindfulness is about deliberate focused attention; about remembering objects in the present, 
and not losing sight of them in spite of complexity; it is about the content of mind, including 
past associations, understanding and refining categorisations;    it is a nuanced awareness of 
context and of alternative ways to cope;  it is understanding the mechanisms of how stories 
get created at the same time as understanding the story.   People are less mindful when they 
are on ‘auto-pilot’, using past categories and fixating on a viewpoint rather than examining 
multiple perspectives.   Being mindful means changing the quality of consciousness, through 
a cognitive process of de-centering – moving outwards from oneself and one’s identities, with 
a focused awareness of what is taking place around one.  
Weick (2009) notes that attempts to increase mindfulness in an organisational context are 
difficult because of the concept driven nature of organisations: using generalisation to 
organise behaviour.   People who practice mindfulness in organisations are described as 
people who blur conceptual skills with mindful practice:  those people who see patterns in 
situations without decomposing them into their component features; who act without 
conscious analytical decomposition and recombination.  They place some reliance on 
intuition, previous decisions and learnings from things that did not work out.    
At the periphery of the organisation, on the edge of chaos, the noticing activities at the 
periphery are more intuitive than planned, make use of inductive reasoning, through mindful 
interactions with external sources, experimenting, and noticing.  The leaders who operate on 
the periphery of the organisation:  those leaders who are open to new experiences in all their 
aspects102 engage in inductive reasoning, notice the patterns as weak signals, and transform 
their raw experience into a narrative form of new knowledge103.   Deliberation in a mindful 
state is less detached and rule bound, more reliant on intuition, knowing from past 
experiences and the know-how to see patterns in situations without decomposing them into 
component features.   
Beliefs colour the sense that is made.  At a leadership level, increased complexity causes 
people to take strong steps to manage the information load.  Believing what is seen is one of 
                                                 
102  Weick (2009) Emotional (feelings); cognitive (ideas), and behavioural (actions).  Negative emotions 
such as anxiety and sadness as well as neuroticism can lower levels of mindfulness.  
103  Wright  (2005) 
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the ways that people make sense under conditions of stress.  The more variety of beliefs in a 
repertoire the less likely it is that important cues will go unnoticed.  Belief driven 
sensemaking in the form of expectations and arguing are the ways that people notice and 
reduce the variety in relevant beliefs which they hold.   
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Chapter 3 
Belief driven Sensemaking 
 
‘I shall consider that the heavens, the earth, colours, figures, sound, and all 
other external things are nought but… illusions and dreams… I shall consider 
myself as having no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, nor any senses, yet 
falsely believing myself to possess all these things.  
Descartes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Belief Driven Approaches to Sensemaking 
This thesis is focused on belief driven approaches to sensemaking as beliefs can obscure the 
ability to notice weak signals, or enable the highlighting of weak signals.   Beliefs and 
identities are intertwined as what people believe shapes their identities.   We have already 
seen that identity is important in sensemaking as there is no sense without a sensemaker.  
Equally there is no sensemaker without his or her belief system.    
The finding of new meaning is important to modern strategy making and therefore belief 
driven processes, where new meaning is found, rather than action driven processes, where 
meaning is created to support actions, are the focus of this research.  Beliefs are not truths;  
they are the pre-existing trusted and accepted norms which individuals use to make sense, 
and therefore vary between individuals.  Personal beliefs, vocabularies of ideologies, third 
order controls, theories of action, traditions and organisational stories influence the content of 
beliefs and therefore the sense that is made in organisations.    Beliefs affect what is noticed 
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and the actions which are selected once cues have been noticed.  Believing as Weick notes, is 
seeing in sensemaking, because beliefs colour and obscure the sense which is made.  When in 
expectations are built upon beliefs, they impact the sense that is made, as people are more 
interested in confirming beliefs than in rebutting or contradicting them.   Arguing is both the 
way in which organisations are structured and one of a few tools readily at hand in 
organisations which can change existing beliefs or create new beliefs.   
Reaching consensus in an organisation between multiple individuals and their belief systems 
requires socialising, interaction and arguing.   At a leadership level reaching consensus 
around strategy is often clouded by the senior leader’s sensegiving activity or the leader’s 
desire to conform to majority views or meet stakeholder expectations.  Leaders should be 
particularly mindful of their own beliefs, and the environment they create, as well as the  
beliefs of the group members when they lead a strategy making session.  
3.2 Believing is Seeing: Sensemaking as Expecting 
Beliefs create expectations which people use to guide interpretation when they make sense.   
Perceivers see what they expect to see, and this expectation drives selective attention104, 
which could be either enabling or constraining.   Expectations cause people to absorb and 
integrate what is seen with what was expected.  Expectations are therefore directive, as they 
tend to filter more strongly than the beliefs embedded in arguments.  This feature of 
expectation causes expecting to be a very strong force in sensemaking and the source of self-
fulfilling prophecies.   Self-fulfilling prophecies tend to amplify for both the perceiver and 
the target creating a new set of organisational cues, which have meaning precisely because of 
the expectations that created them.   
If significant deviations from expectations occur, first surprise, then learning as a stimulus 
response takes place and the perceiver’s expectations will be adjusted to align to what has 
occurred.   Expectations if held strongly, can limit this learning105, particularly at a strategic 
level as they act as filters inhibiting or enhancing what is noticed.  Learning to update 
                                                 
104  According to Maitlis and Sonenshein (2010), people see the events that they believe they have the 
ability to do something about.   Wise people know that they have limited understanding of what is 
happening around them as what is happening is unique to that time.  Wisdom  
105  Starbuck et al (2008): “A few case studies suggest that strategic learning can be very effective, but that 
the firms that gain strategic advantages through learning are abnormal”.  In contrast: Narayan et al 
believe that strategic learning is the foundation of strategy, which supports much other research..   
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expectation based on new information is an important leadership skill.  Weick, in his review 
of the Bhopal disaster discusses three foundational concepts for sensemaking:  commitment, 
capacity and expectation106.   Commitment is a foundation for sensemaking and acting which 
keeps the organization moving. It is also a source of blind spots which obscures noticing 
important but weak cues.  When an organisational actor has committed to a way of thinking, 
moving from this position is difficult and obscures the sense that can be made from cues.  
Maitlis in her assessment of sensemaking in strategic change, notes that “individuals 
undergoing change are often emotionally tied to their current organizational identity and 
therefore reluctant to abandon it”.     
Self-fulfilling prophecies are mentioned not because they should always be avoided but 
because during the strategy making process of uncovering new information, they take the 
form of expectations which can hide weak signals.  As new meanings are found and 
assimilated, people add new meaning to old, learning new information which in turn become 
new expectations107 or prophecies.  Cohen, March and Olsens’ view of an “Organisation as a 
set of procedures for argumentation and interpretation as well as for solving problems and 
making decisions” coincides well with the view of Andersen that “goals are discovered 
through a social process involving argumentation and debate in a setting where justification 
and legitimacy play important roles” and holds important ramifications for the strategy 
making process in an organisation, where strategy making takes place in a similar setting.    
The traditional strategic planning process in an organisation is a process of debate and 
arguing, in which leader sensegiving and excessively linear processes mask weak signal 
identification. Autocratic leadership which attempts to guide the sense that is made, is most 
likely to cause weak signals to be ignored in the interest of meeting the expectation of the 
leader.  Self-fulfilling prophecies then become intentional ways in which people are focused 
on the future, creating strong expectations of what can be expected from the future; so strong 
that people fail to see signals that their expectations are wrong.    
                                                 
106  Weick (1999) : On Commitment: ‘When people make a public commitment that an operating gauge is 
not inoperative, the last thing they will consider during a crisis is that the gauge is operating.  Had they 
not made the commitment, the blind spot would not be so persistent..”  On Capacity:  “people see 
those events they feel they have the capacity to do something about..”  On expectations:  “A plant 
perceived as unimportant proceeds to act out, through turnover, sloppy procedures, inattention to 
details, and lower standards, the prophecy implied in top management’s expectations.” 
107  Updating and doubting expectations cause people to generate possibilities and experiment with them 
until they either abandon them or adopt them as new expectations.   
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3.3   Argument and Arguing 
In an organisation, leaders or managers hold assumptions about the systems or controls for 
which they are responsible.  These assumptions or expectations trigger enactments to confirm 
the expectations, causing what is seen to be what is expected (believing is seeing).  This 
process is the process that causes sensemaking to be concerned with plausibility rather than 
accuracy.   Plausibility is not wrong in strategy making for the future can never be known in 
advance and strategy is nothing more than a plausible story, but by ensuring that weak signals 
are noticed, the best plausible story can be agreed upon. 
Sensemaking in organisations, is not a monologue, but an argument, where people create 
meaning by the use of debate and challenge to reason their way from one idea to the choice of 
another idea.  Arguing therefore is central to changing current beliefs and expectations.  
Arguing is defined for this thesis as an orderly organisational attempt to apply a process to 
reduce the variety of beliefs which are important to individuals, to increase the diversity of 
cues that are noticed, and the extent of the foresight of individuals.   Arguing does not imply 
that moods of anger are necessary to the argument, as anger clouds judgement and may 
inhibit the discussion.   
Arguing is associated with a social constructivist conception108 of meaning making.  In 
organisations arguing is an important precursor to decision making, as in organisational 
settings, there are multiple, often conflicting view of the sense that is made of an event by the 
people in the organisation.  Arguing is therefore central to achieving a collective mind in the 
organisation109.   
Humans think narratively rather than argumentatively but organisations are structured in an 
argumentative manner, implying that arguing is critical to the way in which organisations 
operate.   
                                                 
108  Social constructivism is defined as “a variety of cognitive constructivism that emphasizes the 
collaborative nature of much learning”. Developed by post revolutionary Soviet psychologist Lev 
Vygotsky, who believed that it is not possible to separate learning from it’s social context.  Vygotsky 
also emphasized the role of language and culture in cognitive development. (www.gsi.berkeley.edu).    
109  A collective mind is a double-edged sword as it can both create momentum within an organisation, by 
focusing the minds of the individuals on common goals, but when it manifests as groupthink it can 
cause important events to be overlooked. 
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Argument has both an individual and a social implication110.  In an individual sense, 
argument is reasoned discourse, while in a social sense argument is debate or dispute.  
Argument is a form of higher order thinking and reasoning which uses critical thinking to 
engage deeply with ideas in order to rationally resolve questions, solve problems and clarify 
disputes.  Argument uses deep knowledge in the form of know-how and know-that to 
structure and populate a viewpoint which is then used during the process of arguing.  
Broderiede111 defined argument as having 5 generic characteristics which form a gestalt:   
 An inferential leap from existing beliefs to the adoption of a new belief or the 
reinforcement of an old one.  
 A perceived rationale to justify the leap. 
 A choice among two or more competing claims. 
 A registration of uncertainty in relation to the selected claim. 
 A willingness to risk a confrontation of the claim with one’s peers. 
Walton (1996) shares a similar view of argument as he regards argumentation as a goal 
directed and interactive dialogue in which participants reason together to advance arguments 
by proving or disproving presumptions.  In order for arguing to have sensemaking value it 
needs to follow the criteria described by Broderiede, and particularly towards the end of the 
continuum112, where narratives are powerful sensemaking tools, and  where there a sense of 
trust in one’s peers; to explore the uncomfortable, and risk the team selecting against one’s 
viewpoint.  Two important criteria for effective arguing to make sense can thus be drawn 
from this in order for arguing to be successful in an strategy making environment:   there is 
an environment of trust within which the participants of the arguing process feel safe to 
explore alternative viewpoints; the alternative viewpoints or expectations are made available 
for the participants to consider.   
The fifth dimension of Broderiede’s definition of arguing is where the arguing process begins 
                                                 
110  Weick (1995), quoting Billig:  “The word Argument itself has both an individual and a social 
meaning.  The individual meaning refers to any piece of reasoned discourse.  The social meaning of 
Argument refers, not to chain of reasoning, but a dispute between people.. Individual reasoning is 
embedded in social controversy.  And the unfolding of controversy is what we mean  by Arguing as a 
vehicle for sensemaking.  Because sensemaking starts with a piece of reasoned discourse, it is said to 
be Belief-driven sensemaking. 
111  Broderiede (1974) quoted in Weick (1995) 
112  Weick (1995) 
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in organisations, but confrontation alone is not arguing: arguing takes place when the five 
dimensions can be said to have been addressed simultaneously during a conversation or 
discussion.   Any of the five dimensions affords an entry point to an act of sensemaking, but 
only when all five dimensions are simultaneously present can there be said to have been 
arguing. 
Arguing is said to be useful for sensemaking when an evaluating critic is able to clearly 
explain the rationale behind his or her argument.  Explanations in narrative form allow for 
concrete experience to be connected to more general concepts in an inductive manner.  
People often discover new thought processes or explanations during the process of 
developing and criticising other explanations.  Arguing requires that people should have 
“numerous sensemaking frameworks”113 in order that there are plenty of interpretive 
opportunities when they are faced with a sensemaking event.    
3.4 Arguing as we Believe 
Arguing allows people in organisations to socially construct knowledge and reach agreement 
on the sense that is to be made from a cue or event.   The process uses arguments to foster 
learning, create productive new ways of thinking, promote conceptual change114 and solve 
problems. People learn through arguing when they reflect on what has been said, as learning 
happens through the reflective interactions which occur during arguing.   Critical reflection 
during which the individual critically considers the beliefs or expectations held is a 
transformative learning process which corrects errors or distortions in our beliefs, and is an 
important step towards reaching consensus in arguing.  Collective learning is achieved when 
conceptual ideas identified through intuitive processes are reflected upon and rationalised 
through reasoned debate.    
To argue in an organisational sense does not imply loss of temper or ill will, although the 
common definition of arguing is an acrimonious debate.  A more constructive form of 
arguing takes place when arguing is structured and rational, delivering a deeper level of 
epistemic enquiry, which enables the resolution of both well and ill-structured problems.   
                                                 
113  Starbuck & Milliken (1988) cited in Weick 1995 
114  Conceptual change occurs when people change their understanding of concepts and conceptual 
frameworks to include new paradigms.     
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When participants in arguing formulate arguments115 of which are used in the arguing 
process, a deeper conceptual engagement and understanding occurs, as in the process of 
developing an argument, a participant reflects on what he or she has heard, considers what 
he/she is analysing, chooses viewpoints that best assist him/her to understand the object of 
the criticism, and thereafter is ready to argue the alternative viewpoint and explanation.     
Arguing in an individual sense is to follow a process of reasoned discourse, through 
structured arguments based on the individual’s belief system.  Arguing in a social sense is a 
debate or dispute between two or more people: a connection made on the basis of 
Protagoras’s maxim, which states that “in any question there are two sides to the argument, 
exactly opposite to one another”116.  Thus any individual statement is potentially likely to 
open a social argument when one or more individuals are prepared to argue the other side. 
Solving problems is thus a pervasive activity across all organisations and daily life.   
In any organisational argument there are people who adopt the positions of proposers and 
critics, listeners and protagonists, minorities and majorities.  These positions shift and move 
through the process of arguing, and add dimension and depth to the process of arguing.    At 
leadership levels, where decision making and strategy setting takes place, reasoned discourse 
is used to establish which framework fits the situation best, leading to decision making.    At 
this level too information load, ambiguity and complexity are at their highest and leaders 
need to be mindful of their own bias, and expectations.    
Researcher have classified multiple forms of argument:  Collaborative argumentation is an 
arguing process which facilitates discussions between multiple participants, to achieve a form 
of collaborative reasoning117;  constructive arguments are arguments in which participants 
present explanations which link concrete experience and more general concepts, discerning 
judgements which provide the theoretical or philosophical foundation upon which their 
arguing is based and who are prepared to argue the convincingness of their explanation; 
social arguing is a process in which reasoned discourse is used to articulate a position in a 
group setting. Dialectical arguments which match Broderiedes’ description of a social 
argument, are dialogues between proponents of alternative claims during a discussion.  
                                                 
115  Jonassen, Kim (2010) 
116  Billig (1989), quoted in Weick (1995) 
117  Collaborative reasoning is defined as a group of people working together on the same task or tasks to 
negotiate meanings that may challenge the knowledge of the participants or create new knowledge.  
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Presumptive argument, a form of dialectical118 argument is a goal-directed  and interactive 119 
dialogue in which arguers reason together to prove or disprove presumptions, or to make 
sense120.   Rhetorical arguing is the way in which a leader gives sense to the strategy making 
team initially; setting the scene for the team, articulating  his or her approach and giving 
impetus to the sense making process.  
All of these classifications of argument may be at play at various stages of the proceedings in 
a strategy making session , and all may add value to the final decision which is made, 
although collective and dialectical arguing are the most likely to foster productive debate.   
Positions in arguing are adopted via confrontation: the arguer puts forward his explanation; 
the listener can then confront, and attempt to disconfirm the arguer’s position.  If the listener 
fails to do so, the intersubjective reliability of the argument increases.    
The greater the number of sensemaking frameworks which contradict or adopt different 
viewpoints that people in an organisation have access to, the better their ability to interpret 
the cues presented to them and to participate in arguing in a meaningful way. When an arguer  
sets forth an argument or presents an ‘item’ which was unexpected by the team,  a surprise 
cue in the flow of information is noticed and sensemaking begins.    
Autonomic arousal occurs when a cue is noticed.  If one framework does not fit the cue, then 
another will do, implying that those with more frames are better able to make sense of strange 
events.  The more emotion which is experienced the more information processing capacity is 
absorbed by the emotion, making less available for sensemaking.   Emotions serve as cues for 
sensemaking.  Self-conscious emotions caused by perception can inhibit the sense that is 
made.  Intense negative emotion will cause narrowed attention and systematic sensemaking.  
People will tend to focus on what they deem to be most important and fall back onto earlier 
often over-learned and simpler responses.    Surprises leading to negative emotion are more 
likely to be experienced in long established groups than in newly formed or groups without 
relational identities.  
                                                 
118  Dialectical argument is arguing between an arguer and an audience (real or imaginary).  It represents a 
dialogue between opposing sides of the argument.  The purpose of dialectical argument is to resolve 
differences of opinion or to find a compromise between multiple claims.  Dialetical arguments can 
take place between individuals or in a group environment. 
119  Walton (1992) 
120  Rhetorical arguments, which are one directional dialogues between an arguer and an audience, are 
intended to persuade the audience.  They have a place in sensegiving but not in sensemaking. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 46 
Generalists and people who are able to improvise show less emotional behaviour and less 
extreme emotions121.  This implies that it is important to have generalists in such a group, to 
notice and make sense.  Once they make sense they can suggest or describe what they have 
noticed as a scenario or narrative to the group.     
Reduced information processing capacity may lead to the omission of important sensemaking 
cues and an increase in cognitive inefficiency.   In a creative or problem solving environment, 
the most likely emotion to be experienced will be a positive one for those who solve the 
problem, but a negative one for persons who perceive that the solution to the problem 
indicated a failure on their part, although this is offset by the relational identities which exists 
between the stakeholders.  Provided that there is an environment of trust, the participants will 
argue their viewpoints. 
Positive emotions have a constructive effect on sensemaking, as they broaden the scope of 
attention, and the individual’s ability to deal with stressors, they “..broaden individual’s scope 
of attention and their thought-action repertoires… are important resources in building 
capacity, increasing resilience and individual’s ability to cope with stressors…positive felt 
emotions are associated with the more inclusive and flexible categorization of cues..”122  .  
Positive emotions are associated with a more flexible categorisation of cues, broadening 
attentional focus, and stimulus-response actions.  
3.5 Arguing to Solve Problems  
Cho and Jonassen have noted that “an important skill in solving problems, especially ill-
structured problems, is the production of coherent arguments to justify solutions and actions.”    
Although problems differ in content and complexity, and vary from well-structured to ill-
structured, argument is a critical skill in solving problems123.  Organisations are full of 
problems that need solving, which range from simple operational problems to the strategic 
problem of countering the competition.  Ill structured problems offer more than one possible 
solution, have vaguely defined or unclear goals required from the potential, multiple solution 
paths with multiple criteria for evaluating the solutions are offered, similar in some aspects to 
                                                 
121  Loose coupling, few developed plans and limited standard operating procedures will also generate less 
emotion in an organisational setting, as expectations are limited.  
122  Maitlis, Sonenshein, (2010) 
123  Cho and Jonassen (2002) have shown that argument is more important in solving unstructured 
problems than it is in solving structured problems. 
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the challenges related to weak signals.  Creativity plays a role in first mapping the nature of 
the problem before crafting potential solutions, as creative people associate disparate 
concepts which often lead to solutions or even completely new ideas.   
Arguing alone is not the way to solve problems with multiple potential solutions, but it can be 
used to determine which of the multiple possible solutions presented, is the best fit for the 
organisation.   Possible solutions are presented based on what the individuals have noticed on 
the periphery of the organisation through an application of tacit knowledge.  
3.6 Intuition, Emotion and Rationality  
Intuition or the use of tacit knowledge is increasingly noted by researchers as an important 
dimension in decision making, particularly related to complex problem solving124.  Intuition 
relies on past pattern recognition and the connection of these in new and different ways. 
Sinclair & Ashkanasy (2005) note that:  “intuition is defined as an experience based 
phenomenon which uses tacit knowledge gained through experience and drawn on through 
pattern recognition”.  Intuition is not a conscious cognition process although emotions do 
play a role in intuition.   
The knowledge and skills which lead to intuitive judgment are based on extensive experience.  
When intuition is applied information is processed broadly without singling out specific 
pieces of information, which is why intuition is often seen as irrational125.  Collective 
intuition is the use of tacit knowledge among groups of people to surface new ideas or hidden 
patterns, possibly leading to collective learning126   Hardiman’s (2011) description of creative 
intuition is similar to the concept of mindfulness in some ways, although mindfulness implies 
an enhanced awareness of content and context which creative intuition does not:  ..”involves 
a state of expanded consciousness;  is an open, fluid state of becoming;  focuses on the 
particular rather than the general;  operates through an act of sympathetic identification; relies 
on emotion.”   
                                                 
124  Sadler-Smith (2008) 
125  Sinclair and Ashkanasy, (2005):  1.Intuitive events originate beyond consciousness, 2. Information is 
processed holistically, 3. Intuitive perceptions are frequently accompanied by emotion”.     
126  Nonaka, Toyama, and Konno’s (2000), quoted in Sadler-Smith (2008): “socialisation, externalisation, 
combination and internalisation” or SECI-ba model of knowledge creation (ba signifies a “place”), 
examined the dynamics of the relationships between tacit and explicit knowledge. 
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Rationality is thought to dominate in organisations, although it is a false dichotomy as many 
organisational decisions are made on emotive grounds, but described as rational. Rational 
decision making processes do not deliver the required results in the view of a number of 
researchers127.  There is a role for rationality in organisations, to argue through viewpoints, 
analyse data and extract and enhance meaningful information before making decisions.   
 
Hedlundt’s model of knowledge categories and transformation processes (Figure 1) presents 
a view of knowledge categories and that tacit knowledge underpins the individual process of 
internalisation. While his view is focused on knowledge from individual to  
interorganisational, he notes that groups are the environment in which much innovation, and 
product development takes place. He also notes that the interorganisational domain is also 
important for knowledge development.  This correlates with the view (later in this study) that 
those individuals who operate on the periphery of an organisation (and interact with other 
organisations) are often the individuals who first notice the subtle patterns that are weak 
signals.   The process of reflection is stimulated by articulation, and followed by 
internalisation as individuals internalise knowledge articulated by those individuals who held 
it as tacit knowledge.  Through dialogue, knowledge is extended and appropriated.  Hedlundt 
                                                 
127  Mintzberg (2007), Sinclair & Ashkanasy (2005), Sadler-Smith (2008) 
Appropriation Extension
Dialogue
Expansion Internalization Reflection
Individual Group Organization InterorganizationalDomain 
Assimilation
Dissemination
Articulation
Articulated
Knowledge (AK)
Tacit
Knowledge (TK) 
Figure 1
A Model of knowledge categories and transformation processes: 
Types of transfer and transformation.  Hedlundt 1994 
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is not specific about the kind of dialogue which is used to extend and appropriate knowledge, 
although he notes that articulation allows for open scrutiny and critical testing.   Combining 
rationality with intuition to firstly identity and then amplify weak signals as suggested by the 
application of Hedlundt’s model (Figure 1) of knowledge categories and transformation 
processes, to strategy making will improve strategic teams foresight, and their ability to 
intuitively identify weak signals, then amplify these through a process of rational arguing.     
Hedlund holds the view that groups, and temporary groups in particular, are the place where 
most knowledge transfer and learnings take place in organisations. His model of knowledge 
categories and transformation processes shows the transformation that takes place in groups 
particularly when tacit knowledge (TK) is articulated and internalised through reflection.  In 
his representation of knowledge categories and transformation processes skills and embodied 
knowledge are as important as cognitive knowledge in the transfer of knowledge.   
His research suggests that N-form organisations  which contain temporary groups of people 
acting as a heterarchy, drawn from the middle rather than the top of an organisation,  who 
fulfil the roles of catalyst, architect and protector of knowledge rather than the typical 
monitor and allocator roles, is more suitable for activities which generate innovation.  
Themes within the N-form lend themselves to strategy making: an approach towards 
combination rather than division; focused temporary groups of people; mixtures of people 
with a variety of expertise; lateral communication; leaders who act as catalysts, architecting 
communications and protecting knowledge in a heterarchy.    Although his research was 
broadly focused on corporations, the application of the N-form in a strategy making session 
should create an environment in the necessary conditions for creativity, intuition and debate 
to flourish.  
As stakeholders at a strategy making session reflect, there is therefore an inter‐play between the 
tacit and the explicit knowledge which they hold.   This is articulated as a feed-in process in 
Figure 2, where Sadler-Smith proposes that learning, knowledge and skills influence what is 
noticed.  
It is in this process that tacit knowledge is applied through intuition to notice weak signals, 
which are then shared with the team through conversation and dialogue.    This is a creative 
intuitive process, which taps into cognitive associative processes, expressing and enhancing 
what has been noticed.   
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Weak signals are noticed intuitively and articulated to the group, (see Intuiting in Figure 2) 
during the process which Sadler-Smith calls extension, dialogue in the form of arguing or 
reasoned debate takes place. Provided that the leader sensegiving is not autocratic, there is 
trust among stakeholders and the leader, productive arguing will allow for a feed-forward 
process to make sense of the weak signals articulated, amplifying them into potential strategic 
opportunities, disseminating the ideas among the team.   During the arguing process, which is 
a more logical, and rational approach, balancing against the earlier intuitive approach, it is 
likely that quick conflicts will occur between minority and majority viewpoint holders.  As 
the members argue their way to strategic sense, new knowledge is created, feed-back and 
learning takes place and weak signals are amplified into potential strategic opportunities or 
scenarios.   
3.7 Creativity and Creative identities  
Creativity and intuition are part of any job that contains complex, poorly defined problems 
which require new and useful solutions.128   Creativity is the result of individual 
characteristics, cognitive skills, intelligence, convergent and divergent thinking.  At an 
individual level, creative people first gather information, then formulate concepts to 
understand the problem or generate ideas. Once they have done so, information gathering 
takes place, followed by a process of analogical reasoning which makes it possible to 
combine different concepts into new conceptual combinations, generating new ideas and 
solutions.    
When creative individuals work together in groups or teams to solve problems, heedful 
interrelating is used to create new intersubjective meanings, and collective knowledge.  In 
complex problem solving groups of people often need multiple different forms of expertise to 
articulate and debate all viewpoints, thus collaboration between the different forms of 
expertise is required in a group setting.     In such a group setting, creativity is an iterative 
process, as people argue their way to a final agreed solution or debate their way through 
innovative ideas.  When the group creates social meaning or articulates sense made of a 
common cue, collective knowledge is created.  There is an inherent tension between the 
generic subjectivity of the organisation itself which has embedded controls, and the creative 
process of knowledge creation.    This tension, if not managed correctly, can leads to dispute 
                                                 
128  Mumford et al. (2002), Sinclair & Ashkanasy (2005) 
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or unproductive arguing.   
Creative work is characterised by high ambiguity, demands sustained attention, often over 
long periods of time with negative feedback likely to take place.   Thus creative work also 
takes place under conditions of high stress.  Managing collaboration among different forms of 
expertise places a premium on leadership129, and it should be noted that intensive interaction 
with group leaders is positively related to creativity and conversely, poor interactions or 
supervision led to poor performance of groups.130   
3.8 Meetings as Opportunities for Arguing  
Meetings are sensemakers:131: they provided frames which guide the behaviour of the 
participants who take away with them memories and learnings in the form of conversations, 
writings, memories and decisions.   Meetings frame the behaviour that occurs within them, as 
relating to the business of the meeting.   Meetings help people clarify ambiguity and 
equivocality, string together learnings and make choices from the multiple options presented.  
In meetings managers review the past and extract from that past sufficient information to 
populate their visions of the future, and make decisions about that future.   The sense that is 
made is notably different when meetings are managed by a leader who maintains high levels 
of sense-giving132.  A meeting is a social communicative occasion at which more than one 
person is present, with a pre-determined purpose133.  The form of the meeting frames the 
behaviour that occurs within the meeting.    Meetings make organisations real, create focus, 
purpose and decision-opportunities, which in turn lead to activity within the organisation.  
They are the place where most arguing happens in organisations.   Meetings provide a 
                                                 
129  Langer (1989): “The successful leader may be the person who recognizes that we all have talents and 
thus sees her or his main job as encouraging mindfulness in those being led.” 
130  Mumford et al (2002) 
131  Schwartzman (1987) 
132   Maitlis, (2005)  
133  In the words of Schwartzman (1987), quoted in Weick (1995): meetings are “.. a communicative event 
that organizes interaction in distinctive ways.  Most specifically, a meeting is a gathering of three or 
more people who agree to assemble for a purpose ostensibly related to the functioning of an 
organization or group, for example, to exchange ideas, or opinions, to develop policy and procedures, 
to solve a problem, to make a decision, to formulate recommendations and the like.  A meeting is 
characterized by multiparty talk that is episodic in nature, and participants develop or use specific 
conventions for regulating this talk… The meeting form frames the behavior that occurs within it as 
concerning the “business” or “work” of the group, or organization, or society.” 
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platform for majority and minority groups to articulate and strengthen their respective 
positions, and to argue their way to a new form of sense.    Weick has noted a hunch that 
meetings are frequently unproductive as they are directed at problems of uncertainty which 
would be better handled by other media and often are restricted by autocratic leadership134.  
In a strategy environment, this is supported by Maitlis who found that environments with 
high levels of both leader and stakeholder sensegiving produced strategies that were high in 
animation, with multiple rich accounts. Her work further showed that high levels of control 
without animation produced restricted sensemaking.    Hedland’s investigation of N-form 
organisational characteristics135  supports a view of leadership in such an environment as a 
catalyst, seeking to combine knowledge, rather than divide knowledge.  
Arguments in meetings create generic subjectivity in order to develop premise control and the 
interchangeability of people.  At the top of organisations, where managers need to make 
sense in order to make decisions and provide direction, meetings are a critical way to create 
sense and regulate the variety which presents itself on a daily basis.  Meetings are events in 
which people communicate, via narrative and arguing to share information, persuade and 
make decisions.   
They are events in which ideas or opinions are exchanged, policies or procedures are 
developed, problems are solved, and decisions are made.   
Arguing to make sense in a strategy group session takes place where there is trust between 
stakeholders.  The leader sensegiving provided to the group creates positive energy, and 
allows for creativity.  Intuitive concepts and ideas, are encouraged without judgement, with a 
                                                 
134  Weick (1995): “My hunch is that many of them prove to be unproductive because they are directed at 
problems of uncertainty that are better handled by other media that are more efficient.  I would also be 
that those meetings that are directed at problems of ambiguity fail to handle it because potentially rich 
media are squelched by autocratic leadership, norms that encourage obedience, unwillingness to admit 
that one has no idea what is going on, and so on.  People often treat the existence of multiple 
interpretations as a symptom of a weak organizational culture rather than as an accurate barometer of 
turbulence outside the organization.” 
135 N-Form organizations: “.. put things together, combining rather than dividing...temporary constellations 
of people and units rather than permanent structures.. importance of personnel at lower levels in inter-
functional, interdivisional and international dialogue, rather than handling coordination through 
managers and only at the top.. lateral communication and dialogue rather than vertical.. top 
management as catalyst, architect of communications (technical and human) infrastructure and 
protector of knowledge investment rather than monitor and resource allocator… focusing the 
corporation of fields with rich potential for combining knowledge elements rather than diversifying to 
create semi-independent parts.. heterarchy as the basic structure rather than hierarchy… “ 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 53 
free association scenario approach encouraged, followed by a structured argument to debate 
concepts and ideas. Minority and majority positions are important in organisational 
sensemaking as these routinely occur in meetings.   
3.9 Minority and Majority Positions 
The role and adoption of minority and majority positions in social arguing are important for 
this discussion of arguing to make sense, as these positions induce different sensemaking 
processes which can be utilised to identify or create knowledge.  Two kinds of social 
behaviour136  can be noted in response to majority and minority positions:  Compliance which 
consists of public but not private acceptance of the attempt to influence the position and 
conversion in which there is private but not public acceptance.    
People who adopt the majority positions focus on the source and proposed position of the 
majority viewpoint and coalesce without thorough interrogation of the multiple stimuli 
present, rather focusing on the cues which support the majority position, thus making sense in 
a narrow way.  Multiple and unusual cues are often missed due to this passivity, while flaws 
in the position are unnoticed, leading at times to collapse into incomprehension when the 
argument fails.    Majorities influence through compliance.  When people question the 
majority position their arousal is high causing them to miss cues.  The cues they do notice are 
those of majority position. 
Minority positions trigger a more in-depth cognitive examination of the position of the 
minorities and of alternatives.   Different thought processes are induced than when majority 
positions are supported, with a focus on stimulus and multiple alternative arguments.   More 
cues are examined for the minority position, often leading to innovative solutions.  Minorities 
influence through conversion and people will shift their positions to move closer to minorities 
although the arousal is higher as a result of challenging the majority position.  Arousal is not 
high when questioning minority positions and therefore more cues are noticed, with 
correspondingly more sensemaking opportunities. Minority influence is more likely to cause 
a consideration of alternative viewpoints with a wide ranging thought process, incorporating 
more cues.  Sensemaking influenced by minorities is more stable, more plausible and less 
subject to disconfirmation. 
                                                 
136  Moscovici (1980). Toward a Theory of Conversion Behaviour, As quoted in Weick (1995) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 54 
Minority group members receive less acknowledgement of their knowledge and expertise 
than majority group members137.  Those group members who belong to the minority group 
thus experience an enhanced need for trust status as members of the team.  Social uncertainty 
can lead to mistrust among minority group members due to ambiguity and confusion related 
to the behaviour of other stakeholders towards them.  A sense of mindfulness, of knowing 
where one is in one’s emotional landscape, allows for sympathy, understanding and a 
capacity for accurate analysis and problem solving.  
3.10 Teams, Leadership and Trust  
A team is defined as a group of people who need to cooperate for a period of time to achieve 
a specific goal or accomplish an objective.  The members of a team are typically drawn from 
the ranks based on the merits of their specific skills or knowledge.    Strategy making teams 
are usually the leadership team of an organisation, who gather together for a short space of 
time to craft strategy.  A balance of differences and similarities between stakeholders is 
important to consider when formulating teams as it not only fosters creative thought but 
enables a relational identity138 in the individuals which defines their relationship to the other 
members and to the team.  This builds trust among stakeholders and makes them less 
vulnerable to identity threats.    
An innate tension can be found in individuals, between the need to belong, to have a sense of 
identity with other ‘in’ teams or people; and the need to have something which creates an 
individuation, or uniqueness that sets us apart.  Fellowship with other stakeholders allows all 
members to perceive similarities with others, although if members are too similar, they may 
feel redundant and not part of the team.  The creation of a joint identity for the team may 
reduce tensions, as it creates a collective identity which leads to feelings of trust among 
stakeholders.  Trust is the belief or confidence in a person or organisation’s ability to always 
do what is right with integrity, and fairness.  Trust in another person implies that stakeholders 
will allow themselves to be vulnerable to others actions and results in improved information 
sharing and team synergy.  Collective or shared identity is important to making strategy 
                                                 
137  Van der Zee et al. (2009) 
138   Josselson, (1994). Quoted in Sluss and Ashforth (2007) Identity is at its core psychosocial: self and 
other; inner and outer; being and doing; expression of self for, with, against, or despite; but certainly 
in response to others. It is both those for whom one works and the work of loving  
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because it builds intrapersonal relationships in the strategy making team139.  Identity in teams 
operates at all three levels: individual, interpersonal and collective.140  A strong collective 
identity strengthens strategic foresight.  Typically strategy making sessions are sessions of a 
limited duration during which people from a variety of functional specialities coalesce to 
solve organisational problems.  Intended to be sessions within which synergistic 
combinations result in cross functional teams, the reality is that generally these sessions 
exhibit member cynicism, stress and divisiveness which reduce the team effectiveness, lower 
satisfaction levels and inhibit cohesion141.   
Leadership of these teams and sessions has been found to be critical to the outcomes achieved 
as leaders guide the sense that is made, ensuring a balance between rational and intuitive 
viewpoints142.  Leaders who rationalise what is seen to fit their own expectations, rather than 
appreciating the significance of what is seen, can obscure weak signal identification.  When 
the clock strikes 13, it is not heard by the team because it is not what was expected.  Leader 
sensegiving which is tolerant of disruptive innovation, and outlier views in order to stretch or 
even threaten current beliefs, has a sensitivity for creative identities, builds trust among 
stakeholders and allows for arguing to take place in in order to develop collective views can 
reduce barriers to communication, and allows room for decision makers to champion weak 
signals.   
Trust is a primary attribute associated with leadership.   Trust in leaders is associated with 
stress reduction in individuals where there are high trust levels.  Reduced stress levels means 
that sensemaking is more likely to be effective as less actions will be taken to reduce 
information load.  Intra-team trust reduces the likelihood of task conflict evolving into 
relationship conflict.  Relationship conflict differs from quick conflict as mentioned above as 
                                                 
139   Rolf & Schuh: (2010):  “Individuals who identify with a group will internalize the norms, values and 
goals of this group (e.g. of an organization). Additionally, they will strive for a high status of the 
group as this group membership has become a vital part of their self-definition. As a result, highly 
identified individuals will show attitudes and behaviors which are beneficial to the group..” 
140  Gioia and Thomas (1996), Gioia (2000) quoted in Sluss, Ashforth. (2007): “...the suggestion that 
identity may not be nearly as enduring as first thought, and may be more usefully conceptualized as a 
variable, mutable continuity. If this were found to be the case, then identity would turn out to be an 
issue of plausibility rather than accuracy, just as is the case for many issues that involve organizing 
and sensemaking.” 
141  Peele (2006). 
142  Mailtlis (2005). Maitlis & Lawrence (2007). Mendonca et al (2009). Crossan et al (2011).  
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relationship conflict is a breakdown in intra-member trust where quick conflicts are debates 
between members to build collective perceptions.  Leaders in strategy making teams need to 
reduce stress and improve trust if they are deliver results in which competitive advantage 
through the identification of weak signals can take place.  Oster (2010) found that in teams 
where emergent innovation took place, it did so because the leaders encouraged it. 
Conversely, the expectations of leaders cause them to rationalise what is seen, rather than to 
appreciate the significance of what is seen;  therefore when the clock strikes 13 it is not heard 
because it is not what was expected.143   
Trust is high where minority representation is high.  Improved intra member trust in teams 
can be achieved by the creation of an overarching team identity with which all stakeholders 
can identify.  This reduces the tensions and uncertainties which may exist among the 
members, and increases satisfaction levels by creating a sense of belonging.  As stakeholders 
build relational identities, and become increasingly task-dependent on other stakeholders for 
the fulfilment of plans and goals, there is an increasing expectancy about each other.  
Opportunities for negative emotions therefore increase.  It must be noted that the presence of 
a team identity can itself bring vulnerability to identity threats among stakeholders. High 
performing teams exhibit the same characteristics:  clear goals with a common purpose and 
long term vision,  strong trust relationships among themselves and a sense of accountability 
and commitment to the achievement of their collective goals.   Trust relationships are built on 
consistency of behaviour and honest communications.  Strong trust relationships foster 
innovation among stakeholders144.   
Team diversity brings cognitive complexity to the team, through the variety of viewpoints, 
experience, skills and beliefs145.   Weak signal identification in a strategy making 
                                                 
143  Drummond (2001) 
144  Hoholm & Stronen.(2011) 
145  This is supported by Mendonca et al (2004) who noted that a diverse base of individuals should be 
empowered to make claims for weak signals:   Tolerance of marginal and outlier opinions that 
stretch or threaten current beliefs; Collect the qualitative arguments behind those claims;  Use an 
anonymous argumentative process when it is important to open up new options and use face-to-face 
processes when ensuring commitment is key; Identify and reduce barriers to communication between 
different sectors, departments and communities of experts;  Provide room for senior decision-makers 
who can become champions of hypothetical weak signals amplifying the strategic message among the 
community of stakeholders;  Foster the use of network mediation and brokering approaches using 
information gathered from different sources and media;  Use an anonymous argumentative process 
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environment needs a diverse base of identities and opinions.146   This diversity, of nationality 
or culture, age, gender, skill and experience, demographic differences, can be the cause of 
task conflict in teams, if not controlled, yet too much control kills innovative ideas.  
Eisenhardt (1999) found that quick conflicts were valuable for making decisions in teams and 
fostered creativity.  Task conflict can lead to relational conflict and a lack of trust among 
stakeholders which in turn causes fragmentation of the team.  It has been found147that the 
impact of conflicts in diverse teams can be minimised when there is perceived psychological 
safety and norms to stimulate openness.     
3.11 Scaffolding  
Argumentation is an intellectual skill needed for problem solving, and for productive rational 
debate.148  Although organisations are structured around arguing, people think narratively, 
and need to be guided to formulate effective arguments.  Formulating arguments to support a 
concept or position, with justification for the claims is a form of reasoning is linked to the 
intellectual ability for problem solving.  Cho and Jonassen149 have shown some success with 
facilitating development of cognitive argumentation skills through the provision of 
scaffolding.  Their research further shows that the use of scaffolding to provide direction 
when solving ill-structured problems was particularly effective.  Although research in this 
area is limited, the concept is supported by other research, which suggests that the imposition 
of scaffolding which requires participants to pre-structure their argument is an effective 
means of encouraging the  necessary thought processes needed to build a rationally 
constructed argument.  Cho and Jonassen applied criteria which imposed conversational 
ontologies onto the conversation requiring that participants pre-classify their contributions 
before making them.  This is a leader driven form of sensegiving which guides participants 
by requiring that flesh out a framework or scaffolding with their thoughts before articulating 
them. Scaffolding can take the form of pre-planned questions which are posed to the 
members of a team, to trigger sensemaking and the expression of intuitive thoughts, or the 
                                                                                                                                                        
when it is important to open up new options and use face-to-face processes when ensuring 
commitment is key; 
146  Cho, Jonassen, (2002) 
147  Curseu, Schruijer, (2010) 
148  Cho. Jonassen (2002) 
149 Cho. Jonassen (2002) 
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leader can stimulate debate through asking pre-determined questions after an intuitive 
noticing has been articulated.    
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Chapter 4 
Strategy making  
 
“Each of us can walk only the path he sees at his own feet. Each of us is 
subject to the consequences of his own belief.”   
Morris L West 
 
 
 
4.1 A brief History of Strategy 
Business strategy as a subset of organisational theory, has a relatively short academic history, 
beginning with the work of Chandler in 1962, who first applied strategic direction finding to 
business, to support his viewpoint that the structure of an organisation should follow from the 
strategy.   The origins of strategy can be traced back thousands of years to military campaigns 
and ancient treatises such as ‘The Art of War’150 before strategy became a way of setting 
direction in organisations.   Creating a recipe for the formulation and execution of a 
successful strategy has captured the minds of many scholars since Chandler, and many 
schools of thought, major trends and ideas have been proposed or adopted by business 
schools and management consultants as the concept, context and extent of strategy making 
has evolved to meet the needs of a business world struggling to stay ahead of the competition.     
                                                 
150   The Art of War is a chinese military treatise attributed to Sun Tzu, who was a high-ranking military 
general, strategist and tactician thought to have lived between 544–496 BC. The Art of War is viewed 
as a definitive work on  military strategy and tactics 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_strategy of its time, with an n influence on both 
Eastern and Western military thinking, business tactics and strategy.   
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The formulation of strategy: the strategy making process, is a complex mix of historical 
analysis, knowledge, intuition, understanding of the industry and markets, coloured with the 
beliefs of the strategy makers, to formulate a plausible future direction for an organisation151.   
Some scholars see the formulation process as a linear and structured analytical process to 
deliberately form a strategic direction, while for some others it is an emergent process.   
Strategy is narrative process which produces a story: a plausible, influential and influencing 
work of fiction: a story which can be told to people in the organisation.  If the story telling is 
good enough, the story becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.   The making of strategy takes 
place, much like change and crisis, in situations of ambiguity, confusion, and often feelings 
of tension and disorientation152 among those making the strategy.  The real challenge of  
crafting strategy however lies in detecting the suble discontinuities which lead to innovation 
and advantage.    
Increasing turbulence153 increases the need for strategy making which can enable 
organisations to take advantage of market opportunities154.  From business planning through 
linear analytical methods, to the emergent strategy making described by Mintzberg and 
                                                 
151  Mintzberg. (2005): “Strategy making is an immensely complex process involving the most 
sophisticated, subtle, and at times subconscious of human cognitive and social processes” 
152  Maitlis and Sonenshein  (2010), view both crisis and change situations as situations of enactment: 
people generate the environment through their own actions and their subsequent attempts to make 
sense of their actions.   
153  Turbulence is not new, but we are living in a time when the turbulence is unprecedented:  the global 
financial crisis which began in 2008 is one of the worst on record. The rate and pace of change is 
increasing with globalisation; increasing complexity and accelerating information exchanges as well 
as huge market volatility.  Increasing turbulence increases the need to find new ways to keep the edge 
and remain competitive. As Boisot (1998) noted, “The environment to which strategy is called to 
respond has undergone a profound transformation in the past two decades…strategy is an emergent 
process shaped as much by the capacity of people throughout the organization to respond to or create 
unexpected opportunities as by the strategic intentions of those at the top ..”  
154  The need for strategic planning is more important, but also less structured in turbulent economic times 
or when businesses undergo a period of uncertainty or instability: compared to organisations in a state 
of stability, or operating in an environment of stability, where strategies or plans are articulated in 
detail and followed, without the need for adjustment.  Mintzberg (Strategy bites back) notes that 
strategic planning rises in importance in turbulent or uncertain times. Gryskiewicz notes that this 
turbulence is the resonance that stimulates innovation and renewal. Pralahad & Hamel note: “the need 
for strategic thinking and behaviour among managers has never been more urgent”. 
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others155, strategy making is of necessity adapting to the changing business world in which 
people are bombarded with fast changing, ambiguous and complex information156.   
For the further purposes of this thesis, strategy is defined as: ‘the mindful crafting of a future 
vision for an organisation, based on deep understanding, beliefs, knowledge of the 
organisation and it’s environment, analogical and rational thinking and a willingness to 
explore the unexplored’.   
4.2 The Context of Strategy157  
The pace of global change is accelerating exponentially158 and the business environment is 
changing constantly in response.   Societal frames of reference have undergone fundamental 
changes159 which have changed the expectations that society has of the value to be delivered 
                                                 
155  Deliberate strategizing is acting intentionally to provide direction which enables and encourages 
commitment.  Deliberate strategizing is a very formalised process which requires management to plan 
to co-ordinate all strategic and operational activities.  Those who advocate deliberate strategizing view 
any emergent strategy as a brilliant improvisation or s stroke of luck.   This form of strategy making 
encourages long term thinking, but much of the strategy is based on assumption and forecasts.  
 Emergent strategy is based on a coherent pattern of action which evolves over time.   Managers may 
have no prior intentions, but question assumptions, challenge ideas, encourage learning and their 
direction is pieced together over time. Those who advocate emergent strategy believe it is flexible as it 
is an approach which uses sensemaking and reflective thinking while learning and envisioning.  It is 
very much an experimental, and changing approach,  which is messy and often fragmented.   It is 
opportunistic and allows for a lot of flexibility.  Emergent strategy is seen as useful for dealing with 
wicked problems. 
156  Prahalad & Hamel (1994):  “Thoughtful members of the academic community are increasingly 
recognizing that the concepts and tools of analysis that formed the backbone of the strategy literature 
during it’s period of major growth (1965-85) may need a basic re-evaluation in order to pave the way 
for new ideas” 
157  Langer (1989):  “Who we are at any one time depends on the context in which we find ourselves” 
158  Many scholars have referred to the increasing rate of change, including Alvin Toffler in Future Shock, 
but limited research has been conducted to measure the rate of increase.  Ray Kurzweil (2001) in his 
book ‘The Law of Accelerating Returns’, theorizes that Moore’s Law can be applied to the 
exponential change in other areas of technology.  He believes that as a technology matures, it becomes 
exponentially more effective, causing greater resources to become deployed towards further progress 
of that technology, in turn generating further exponential growth.  He cites technological progress as 
currently doubling every decade, implying that the technological progress made during the twenty-
first century is equal to the progress made in the previous 200 centuries.   
159  Increased democratisation, emancipation of women, and other previously repressed classes and races, 
family dis-integration, improved access to education and literacy levels, immigration, urbanisation, the 
reduction in the power of some large religions,  reduced nuptiality, and other changes within societies 
have impacted on the western world in ways that have not yet been fully quantified, but which have 
fundamentally changed the way in which society is constructed.     
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by business160.  Technological change and economic growth cycles are linked161 to the 
evolution of economic, organizational, competitive and management thought.    Dealing with 
information load, ambiguity and complexity, while managing unpredictable events and the 
vulnerabilities which arise from the complexity and turbulence is the challenge facing the 
leaders of today and tomorrow.    Failures in foresight can be very costly. Disasters take a 
while to incubate but once arrived overwhelm sensemaking.  162 
We are living the unprecedented times of which Drucker warned: times in which we are more 
interconnected but further apart163 with the danger of more conflict as a result.   The pressure 
on leaders to make strategic sense is increasing.   
Focusing on strategy is increasingly difficult in such times164 but more important than ever 
before165.    As turbulence increases so does the reliance on heuristics, and the familiar166. 
Weick speculated that this would cause occasions for sensemaking to be defined more 
idiosyncratically.   In a strategy making context, sensemaking is multi-contextual, and it is 
                                                 
160  Jensen in Forbes Magazine has questioned the importance of shareholder value as a driver of business 
for the future in the wake of the 2008 recession  
161  Technological, economic and management evolution is interlinked.  Some scholars believe that there 
are economic cycles of prosperity and depression.   Peter Dicken (2011) said that :“The idea that 
economic growth occurs in a series of cycles or ‘waves’ goes back almost 100 years.  One particular 
type of wave – usually known as a Kondratief wave (K-wave) – is a long wave of more or less 50 
years duration...  Four waves have been indentified; we are now in the early stages of a fifth. Each 
long wave may be divided into four phases: prosperity, recession, depression and recovery.   Each 
wave tends to be associated with particularly significant technological changes around which other 
innovations – in production, distributiuon and organization, awarm or cluster and ultimately spread 
through the economy.  Although such diffusion of technology stimulates economic growth and 
employment, demographic, social, industrial, financial and demand conditions also have to be 
appropriate. In other words it’s the ‘total package’ that counts. … Each phase is associated with 
characteristic forms of economic organization, cooperation and competition.” 
162  Foresight includes the use of intuition, experience, minority views and contrary thinking. Foresight 
failure implies that weak signals which mask opportunity, risks and new developments can be missed 
due to dominant logics or managerial recipes. 
163  Drucker (1998).  “As we advance deeper into the knowledge economy, the basic assumptions 
underlying much of what is taught and practised in the name of management are hopelessly out of 
date… Most of the assumptions about business, technology and organisation are at least 50 years old, 
they have outlived their time”  
164  Gordon Brown (former British Prime Minister) referred to this in acknowledging that he found it hard 
to focus on strategy: as you have to deal with immediate events, like it a bank’s going to go under” 
(Viner, based on an interview for the Guardian, 20 June 2009) 
165  Mintzberg 1987 noted the importance of strategy in turbulent times. 
166  Mintzberg 2005: “.. as much as 90 percent of all information we are searching for aims at supporting 
views, beliefs or the hypothesis that we have long cherished..” 
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very easy to miss the weak signals which could mean the next competitive advantage or a 
new source of revenue. Intelligence about the future is essential for making meaningful 
strategies167.   
A strategy is successful when it can be seen to be achieving its long-term and consistent goals 
through effective implementation which is based on a profound understanding of the 
organisation and it’s competitive environment.   Strategy making takes place in the context of 
that complex human social structure: the organisation;  a complex evolving system168 in 
which the rules can and should, change over time.    
Organisations are built around people.  People show a strong preference for reducing 
complexity169, disorder and data processing loads, to allow them to focus on the work at 
hand.   Abstraction and codification of knowledge; common beliefs, values and assumptions; 
and standard plots contribute to the creation of generic subjectivity170 among the people of 
the organisation, reducing the need to make sense.    This reduction in the need to make sense 
is fine in organisational routines, scripts and normal organisational activities.  When it comes 
to strategy making, what is needed is more sensemaking, not less. Strategy making is a 
subjective-interpretive process, taking place as multi-contextual sensemaking, where the 
sense that is made is dependent on the sensemakers, their beliefs and frames, and the cues 
they notice. Weak signals are often the hazy patterns we are not sure we have seen:  
“Sensemaking starts with chaos.. the order in organizational life comes just as much from the 
subtle, the small, the relational, the particular and the momentary as it does from the large, 
the substantive, the written, the general and the sustained.. It is about organising though 
communication171”  
Traditional linear methods of strategy making used deductive reasoning with a linear process 
to first order, then analyse data and draw reasonably scientific conclusions from it.  In the 
                                                 
167   Ansoff .  weak signals consist of advanced and imprecise symptoms of impending future problems  
168  Jackson (2005):  “Social systems are not just complex adaptive systems bound by the fixed rules of 
interaction of their parts.  Rather they are ‘complex adaptive systems’ bound by the fixed rules of 
interaction of their parts.”   
169  Boisot (1998) 
170  Generic subjectivity is the level in an organisation (Wiley, quoted in Weick) at which selves are 
replaced by rules, role-followership, and the social network of the organisation.  Generic subjectivity 
creates organisational controls, which reduce opportunities for innovation.  
171  Weick Sutcliffe, Ostsfeld (1999) 
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turbulent world of today, these methods for systematic strategy planning  make it difficult to 
achieve meaningful results172.  
Inductive reasoning is the reasoning which notices patterns and draws tentative hypotheses 
from the patterns.  Deductive strategy making at the centre of the organisation is mechanistic: 
focused on current and traditional knowledge and the exploitation of this to develop a 
competence-based advantage.  
Inductive or transformational strategy making takes place close to the periphery of the 
organisation by those who interact with external sources both within the industry and 
without: it is focused on the creation of new knowledge, and identification of potential 
opportunity.  It is a more intuitive form of strategy making which uses trial and error, 
informal contacts, noticing, experiments and creative processes to combine discontinuous 
concepts to form new ideas.  Leaders at the periphery are bricoleurs adept at transforming  
raw experience into a linguistic frameworks to make sense173.  The interpretive activities of 
the leaders at the periphery use a variety of methods to create an understanding of the world, 
but mostly interpretive acts to improvise, develop wisdom174, respectfully interact and to 
communicate.  A characteristic of wisdom is foresight or the belief that the future can inform 
the past175 
Even though leaders are tasked with strategy making, they are not necessarily strategic 
thinkers.  Strategic thinkers in the view of Mintzberg, are those visionaries who are able to 
                                                 
172  Grant (2008), Mintzberg (2009) 
173  Levi-Strauss (1966) quoted in Wright. (2005):  “The Bricoleur” is adept at performing a large number 
of diverse tasks but, unlike the engineer, he does not subordinate each of them to the availability of 
raw material and tools conceived and procured for the purpose of the project.  His universe of 
instruments is closed and the rules of his game are always to make do with ‘whatever is at hand’, that 
is to say with a set of tools and material which is always finite and is also heterogeneous, because 
what is contains bears no relation to the current project, or indeed to any particular project, but is the 
contingent result of all the occasions there have been to renew or enrich the stock or to maintain it 
with the remains previous construction or destructions”  
174  Weick (1995)“…wise people know they do not fully understand what is happening at a given moment, 
because what is happening is unique to that time.  They avoid extreme confidence and extreme 
caution, knowing that either can destroy what organizations need most in changing times, namely, 
curiosity, openness, and the ability to sense complex problems.  The overconfident shun curiosity for 
fear it will only deepen their uncertainties.  Both the cautious and the confident are closed-minded, 
which means that neither will make good judgements.  In this sense, wisdom, understood as 
simultaneous belief and doubt, improves adaptability.“  
175  Gioia et al. (2002).  This understanding of foresight proposes that scenarios in which manager locate 
themselves in the future, the past and the present can create improved sensemaking  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 65 
see the organisation from a multitude of viewpoints176, and extract meaningful directions 
from the many viewpoints they have. 
“The more different ideas we process, the more likely it is that other associations not at all 
closely related to the original topic will be triggered”. 177 
4.3 Strategy  
Strategy is a form of story-telling with multiple plausible endings, as all strategy is fiction 
until it can be proven to be implementable.  Strategies are traditionally conceived as visions 
and plans, yet as Mintzberg has observed178, often the realisation of the strategy delivers 
something different, as strategy emerges from the streaming of organisational life.   Finding 
the unexpected patterns and signals on the periphery and then holding the conversations 
necessary to make changes is the challenge facing leaders today179 as they need to focus 
people’s effort and ensure that collective action takes place to keep the organisation in 
play.180   
If “..a problem is a gap, difference, or disparity between the way things are and the way one 
wants them to be”181, then strategy making is a problem.  There is no common theory or 
definition of strategy creation182; and limited agreement among scholars regarding the nature 
of strategy.    Strategy has been variously defined as "a pattern in a stream of decisions..’ 
collectively a perspective, plan, position, and a pattern"183;  strategy is ".. about shaping the 
                                                 
176  Mintzberg in Garratt (2003) 
177  Gryskiewicz. (1999) 
178  Mintzberg, (2007)Tracking Strategies: towards a general theory 
179  Mintzberg ( 1994) referred to attending to weak signals as the Leaders challenge.  
180  Mintzberg (2001) 
181  Smith quoted in Weick (1995).  He further defines a problem as having a gap which is “difficult to 
close”  and one which “must warrant a place on one’s agenda” 
182  Hamel (2003): “The dirty little secret of the strategy industry is that it doesn’t have any theory of 
strategy creation 
183  Mintzburg’s views were anticipated by Kenneth Andrews (1971)who defined strategy as: "Corporate 
strategy is the pattern of decisions in a company that determines and reveals its objectives, purposes, 
or goals, produces the principal policies and plans for achieving those goals, and defines the range of 
business the company is to pursue, the kind of economic and human organization it is or intends to be, 
and the nature of the economic and non-economic contribution it intends to make to its shareholders, 
employees, customers, and communities.”  
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future.. to get to desirable ends with available means"184.  Competitive strategy is about being 
different185 when compared to competition.    
Much emphasis has been laid by business on strategic planning, but strategic planning is not 
strategy making186, focusing effort on the plan and not on the desired outcomes.   Strategy is 
by its nature paradoxical.  It is about change; yet the desired change is rooted in stability187, 
as the organisation strives to create continuity and longevity.  Strategy is action driven, but is 
often based on belief and perception; and these same beliefs and perceptions can prevent the 
action from occurring.   Strategy is a vision of the future, articulated in a plan.  It is also, as 
Mintzberg observed, a pattern of behaviour or actions, observed or enacted.  It is the 
perspective or viewpoint which the organisation adopts as its own; which is used to shape 
decisions and determine competitive positions.  Simon188 referred to strategy as “The 
series…of decisions which determines behaviour over some stretch of time may be called a 
strategy’, implying that strategy is not only about decisions, but also about behaviour.   
If a decision is a ‘commitment to action’189, then strategy is not only concerned with 
direction, positioning, and behaviour patterns, but must also be concerned with mindful190  
action-taking to achieve the desired outcomes.  It must be concerned with the external 
environment, as strategy creates the links between the external environment and the 
organisation.  The external environment is the source of change; change that impacts the 
organisation through altered states of competition; radical changes to technology; economic, 
changes to economic, social or political landscapes which constantly occur in the world.   
                                                 
184  McKeown (2011) 
185  Porter (1998) 
183 Mintzberg  (1998)“The great fallacy of strategic planning is that because analysis is not synthesis, 
strategic planning has never been strategy making”.  Hamel also noted  that there is no process to 
create unique ideas in strategy and that revolutionary ideas have always been the product of lucky 
foresight.  He then noted that there are five ways to rethink strategy: with new voices, new 
conversations, new perspectives, or seeing in new ways, with new passions and by experimentation. 
187  Mintzberg  (1998) “Strategy is about change, but change with the intention of creating consistency and 
permanence.” 
188  Simon (1993). 
189  Mintzberg, Raisinghani, Theoret (1976) 
190  According to Weick (2005), mindfulness is when we realize our current expectations, continuously 
improve those expectations based on new experiences, and implement those expectations to improve 
the current situation into a better one 
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Making strategy is complicated:   “Creating strategy is judgemental designing, intuitive 
visioning and emergent learning:  it is about transformation as well as perpetuation;  
cooperation as well as conflict;  it has to include analysing before and programming after as 
well as negotiating during, and all of this must be in response to what can be a demanding 
environment.  Just try and leave any of this out and see what happens”191.   
Within organisations, strategy making is concerned with creating new knowledge, or 
applying old knowledge in new ways to create value for the organisation.  It is complex, and 
profound, and yet simple.  
The ability to create innovative products or services has come to be seen as a key goal of 
many organisations.  Innovation is a sensemaking process and a creative process, which 
requires expertise in different fields and a deep knowledge of the organisation and it’s 
industry.  Typically innovators have broad experience, multidisciplinary minds, and are 
intellectually curious.   In an organisational sense, being innovative does not come easily to 
organisations with tight couplings and well established intrasubjective and generic subjective 
processes as the crystallised conversations and texts are part of the vocabularies of the 
organisation, holding tight to the organisational structures.     
Much effort and research around strategy has been related to strategic planning as a linear, 
structured, analytical and repeatable process, yet strategic thinking, which drives the entire 
process of strategy making; is often non-linear, unstructured, and non-repetitive192.   In 
environments of turbulence, complexity and high uncertainty, the rationality of decision 
making processes decreases 193 due to biased misrecall, expectations and other sensemaking 
failures.   
4.4 Leaders: The Strategy Makers  
Strategy making starts with a strategy maker.  The strategic makers are the leaders or 
knowledge holders in an organisation. Traditionally Boards of Directors were those 
                                                 
191  Mintzberg, (1998) 
192  Mintzberg, Raisinghani, Theoret (1976) found that decision processes from which strategic decisions 
are created is unstructured in that the selection phases of decision making do not follow a sequential 
relationship. Rather these can come in any order, loop and repeat.  By contrast, Henderson B of the 
Boston Consulting Group believed that strategy should mostly be a linear, logical process:  “..good 
strategy must be based primarily on logic, not.. on experience derived from intuition..” 
193  Eisenhardt  and Zbaracki (1992) 
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responsible for strategic outcomes but had limited knowledge of the internal and external 
environments of the organisation, and thus delegated the responsibility for making strategy to 
CEOs and executive management.   These strategy makers are the leaders of the organisation, 
operating amongst turbulence, subject to high levels of information load, complexity and 
ambiguity;  which cause an autonomic arousal response, reducing their ability to make 
sense194.  The leaders are tasked with the identification of new directions, based on new 
opportunities.  They have either deep knowledge or broad experience, are people from a 
variety of functional specialities who focus for limited duration on the future or on solving 
the strategy problem.  Strategy is the learning process, performed by strategic thinkers who 
design, plan and enact strategy.  In so doing they gain deeper knowledge of their 
environment, and understand how to identify the weak signals which indicate new 
opportunities.  Learning as they act and enacting the learning as they go, these thinkers 
incorporate experience, insight, and intuition, synthesising existing knowledge into activating 
the vision of the future for the organisation195.    
The making of strategy is a social cognitive process rooted in the organisational culture, 
intended to produce economic value add.   It is about making sense of patterns, finding the 
weak signals in the stream of information that passes the strategy makers.  It is influenced by 
the identities and perspectives or worldviews of the organisational decision makers which in 
turn filters their noticing and ability to create new ideas through cognitive processes of 
association. Decision making requires a multidimensional approach based on bounded 
rationality, emotions, intuition, heuristics, and insight.196  
4.5 Strategic Thinkers 
Strategic thinking creates strategy, through the words and language of the organisation.  It is 
a social process, where the leaders think associatively and creatively197, about the 
                                                 
194  Sinclair & Ashkanasy  (2005) note  that linear rational models are not appropriate for conditions of 
rising pressure and high ambiguity. 
195  Mintzberg,(1998)  Grant (2008),  
196  Sinclair & Ashkanasy (2005) 
197  Mintzberg (2005) refers to this as “strategic thinking means seeing ahead. But, you cannot see ahead 
unless you can see behind, because any good vision of the future has to be rooted in an understanding 
of the past… strategic thinking is seeing above… strategic thinking is also inductive thinking: seeing 
above must be supported by seeing below… You can, however, see ahead by seeing behind and see 
above by seeing below and still not be a strategic thinker. That takes more—creativity for one thing. 
Strategic thinkers see differently from other people; they pick out the precious gems that others miss. 
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organisation, it’s future and patterns in the information which they observe.  They talk the 
walk of the organisation198, by getting out into the organisation, and talking, holding 
conversations with other strategic thinkers and with knowledgeable people within the 
organisation, scanning codified and abstracted knowledge; and gathering un-codified, and 
non-abstracted knowledge.  Strategic thinkers observe the streaming of organisational life 
within their organisations and in their environments, and identify cues from the stream of 
disorder and chaos, usually on the periphery, which have the potential to provide 
opportunities.   
4.6 Emergent Strategy and Strategic Intent 
Strategy is about seizing opportunity and should therefore create innovation, yet the 
structured and controlling nature of strategic planning as it has been practiced in many 
organisations, kills the inconsistency which creativity needs to thrive199.   Often not 
formulated as an explicit plan, strategy can be observed as a “..consistency of direction based 
on a clear understanding of the “game” being played and a keen awareness of how to 
manoeuvre into a position of advantage.”200   As strategy research evolved along with 
business and management, numerous schools of thought201 created views on strategy.  
Mintzberg categorised the schools of thought into ten schools: from the design school to the 
                                                                                                                                                        
They challenge conventional wisdom—the industry recipe, the traditional strategy—and thereby 
distinguish their organizations.  Since creative thinking has been referred to as lateral thinking, this 
could be called seeing beside…. beside seeing beside, strategic thinkers have to see beyond. Creative 
ideas have to be placed into context, to be seen in a world that is to unfold… Seeing beyond constructs 
the future—it invents a world that would not otherwise be” 
198  Weick, (1995) 
199  Creativity needs inconsistency in order to produce innovation: “creative work often requires 
collaborative efforts of differing composition, duration and intensity.. of course the need for 
collaboration among people places a premium on leadership.” Mumford et al (2002)   
200  Grant (2008)  
201  Mintzberg (1998): 
The Design school where strategy formation is a process of conception 
The Planning school where strategy formation is a formal process 
The Postitioning school where strategy formation is an analytical process 
The Entrepreurial school where strategy formation is a visionary process 
The Cognitive school where strategy formation is a mental process 
The Learning school where strategy formation is a learning process 
The Power school where strategy formation is a process of negotiation  
The Cultural school where strategy formation is a collective process 
The Configuration school where strategy formation is a transformation process  
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transformation school of thought around strategy, they have made it clear that there is as yet 
no definitive way to make strategy. All of the different schools make important contributions 
to the way strategy is made, and the way strategic thinkers think, but none can stand alone, 
for strategy is more than the sum of the parts.   Broadly strategy is seen as either deliberate or 
emergent.  Scholars differ on how the mix between the two should be approached in an 
organisation.  Mintzberg suggests that this depends on organisation and it’s state of 
development.  De Wit & Meyer suggest that the results if they can be are very rewarding 
although the process requires ingenuity and lots of energy.  Grant believes that the two 
approaches should be complementary.   
Emergent strategy describes an approach to strategy which assumes that foresight is unable to 
discern or anticipate future states. Intended strategies will not be fully realised, rather other 
strategies will emerge as ‘leakages’.  Data for dealing with the opportunities that emerge will 
be found at any level in the organisation, where an ad-hoc response will need to be 
formulated.  Boisot (2003) describes this approach as a legitimation of ‘disjointed 
incrementalism’ operating at the strategic level, and believes that it’s effectiveness depends 
on a process of learning by doing which is likely to be disrupted by turbulence. Strategic 
intent is a broad intuitive statement of strategic intention formulated to guide the organisation 
without following a detailed descriptive process.  Both approaches expect opportunities to 
emerge from the chaos.  Fostering strategic adaptation through establishing a few broad 
principles and directives to guide decentralised decision making is consistent with the tenets 
of complexity theory202, although the optimal balance between design and emergence 
depends on the stability of the external environment203.  
4.7 Turbulence and the Implications for Finding Weak Signals 
Turbulence creates multiple uncodifiable patterns, along with conflict: the multiple patterns 
or weak signals attract supporters and detractors, and the resultant conflict stalls the 
organisation.     Boisot, quoting Ross Ashby’s (1958)law of requisite variety proposes that in 
environments with a high rate of change and high rates of environmental turbulence, a 
balance needs to be maintained with a high rate of learning and capacity to extract useful 
information from the chaos : see Figure 3 below:   
                                                 
202  Grant (2008) 
203  Grant (2008) Mintzberg (2007 )  
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To the right of line A the system can retain it’s integrity, whereas to the left of Line A the 
degree of turbulence exceeds the degree of understanding.  In the lower portion of the figure 
where turbulence is low, improved understanding can take place slowly moving from the left 
of the figure to the right.  In the upper regions where turbulence is high, moving from left to 
right to increase understanding is a discontinuous process, in which new patterns or weak 
signals emerge.   In this region, the sense that is made is no longer built on the lessons of the 
past but on assimilating new information from emergent patterns.  Learning requires the 
organisation to move upward along Line A, rather than downward along Line B.   
Many countries in the world have become mixed economies204,  struggling to create public  
services amid the shifting sands of regulation and de-regulation. The competitive arena has 
                                                 
204  A mixed economy is one in which the  private sector, profit seeking enterprises and the accumulation 
of capital drive the economy, although the state exerts considerable indirect influence over the 
economy through fiscal and monetary policies, often providing welfare benefits and environmental 
protection.    
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Figure 3:  The Learning  Environment (Boisot in Garratt 2003)  
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changed dramatically, necessitating a new way of looking at strategy and strategy making205.  
Competitive advantage is not easily sustained in many if not most industries.  The economic 
environment post the economic downturn of 2008 is one in which competitive advantage is 
ephemeral.   Being able to exploit and move in and out of states of advantage is key to future 
success.  
4.8  Sensegiving  
Sensegiving is a leader behaviour used during change, strategy making and other 
organisational activities where followers need to be directed.  Maitlis, 2005 has shown that 
the type of sense-giving provided to teams by leaders206 or stakeholders can significantly 
impact the outcomes of the sense made during meetings. This research, although focused on 
meetings, may hold implications for sensemaking in strategy making sessions, which are 
meetings of the strategy makers.  The manner of the sensegiving application can either inhibit 
or enhance the quality of sense that is made.  Sensegiving in a structured strategy making 
environment forms a framework which gives structure to the process by articulating 
guidelines for stakeholders, and prompting debate and arguing. 
Leaders are the sensegivers, the story-tellers, who give sense to others by telling stories to 
enable others to make sense. Extending the sensegiving to other stakeholders improves the 
quality of the outcomes, resulting in ongoing emergent and consistent actions.  Sensgiving 
stories are rhetorical arguments, meant to persuade others.  The vision which they present is 
an idealised future state in which stakeholders and the leader present a vision of an idealised 
future state, and thereafter engage in a retrospective interpretation of how that future state 
occurred.   Leader and stakeholder sensegiving in strategy sessions has been shown to 
significantly influence the quality of the strategy that is made.  Sensegiving with high levels 
of both animation and control from both leaders and stakeholders leads to unitary rich 
accounts and outcomes which are emergent and consistent.  Control in this instance is not 
                                                 
205  Pralahad and Hamel (1994) saw the competitive space as having changed dramatically from that of 
previous decades, due to both regulation and deregulation; less protectionism; structural changes 
brought about by technology, and technological discontinuities; excess capacity, mergers and 
acquisitions, environmental concerns, the emergence of trading blocks, globalisation.    In their view 
the ‘..thoughtful members of the academic community are increasingly recognizing that the concepts 
and tools of analysis that formed the backbone of the strategy literature during its period of major 
growth (1965-85) may need a basic re-evaluation in order to pave the way for new ideas..’ 
206 Persons with highest authority level in an organisation. 
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autocratic control, but guidance to the process, ensuring that particpants feel the freedom to 
participate without fear.  
Leader sensegiving which is highly directive, with low stakeholder sensegiving results in 
restricted organisational sensemaking, narrow unitary visions, with one time action plans.  
Where leader sensegiving is high and stakeholder sensegiving is low, and leader directiveness 
is limited, it results in guided sensemaking, unitary rich accounts with a series of emergent 
actions.  See Figure 4.   
 
Leaders are sensegivers, and when this sensegiving is in the form of excitement and 
enthusiasm to signal a commitment to a new direction, it triggers positive emotion.  This 
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positive sensegiving can however also create blinkers which can cause important cues to be 
overlooked.   
 
 
4.9 Sensegiving Narratives  
Stories or narrative are used by leaders as a sensegiving resource when they guide followers 
to make sense.  They pass on visions, and important strategic information through narratives.  
People think narratively rather than argumentatively or paradigmatically, which is why story 
telling in organisations is an important communication tool, as it is one of the ways in which 
people try to make the unexpected expectable.  Any narrative is filtered through the lens of 
the story-teller, providing a selective retrospective narrative of the event or events.  
Interesting stories challenge existing models of reality as acceptance of the stories encourages 
updates to existing frames.  The presence of stories in an organisation implies a rich culture, 
and knowledge base and reduces arousal when problems do occur as there are always stories 
to refer to for guidance.   Stories as a form of narrative tie together disparate concepts and 
integrate fact with conjecture, creating a causal order to events.  They enable people to talk 
about history and the present in a way that is memorable, allowing them to use the knowledge 
gained as guide to the future.  Thus stories become part of the organisational knowledge 
database, assisting in problem diagnosis and reinforcing third order controls.   
Scenarios are socially constructed stories which people naturally engage in to predict 
plausible potential futures: hunches or stories of what could be, constructed by people who 
operate at the periphery. Narratives describe multiple potential or interlinked realities.  
Language and authorship influence strategic stories: traditional sensegiving related to strategy 
see strategic communication as value free and uninfluenced by either individual or group 
interpretation.   Scenarios can create a common vocabulary through which  “..people learn, 
develop, unlearn, relearn and apply common understandings by which to exchange, combine, 
create, renew, and transfer tacit, implicit, and codified processes of knowing from blueprints, 
ideas, emotional states and fuzzy hunches into problem definitions, solutions, added value 
and markets in lifeworlds of ongoing uncertainty, ambiguity, and contingency.”207  
                                                 
207  O’Donnel et al (2000), quoted in Wright (2005) 
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Individuals engage in scenarios as part of everyday thinking and making sense by 
constructing and testing possible responses in multiple possible futures.  
 
 
4.10 Weak Signals  
On the periphery of any modern organisation there exists a ubiquitous turbulence.  This 
turbulence has a resonance that stimulates innovation and renewal, for those organisations 
who can see the opportunities.208   Within the periphery, on the edge of chaos are the weak 
signals.  Too far in one direction and the rigidity of rules, systems and organisation will 
obscure what is seen.  Too far in the other direction and disorder rules, creating too much 
noise to clearly see signals.  We live in a non-zero-sum world.  New opportunities or ideas 
can emerge from the periphery without precedent.  On the periphery are often surprising 
assymetries and it is from these places that black swans emerge.   Weak signals are called 
weak not because they lack importance but because the signals they emit are easily obscured 
by other information  including personal frames, attitudes and bias of those observing them.    
The natural tendency of people is to fall back onto heuristics and intuition209 to deal with the 
confusion.   Believing what is seen is the challenge as seeing fresh opportunity requires a 
mindful openness to surprises and challenges to the status quo. In the arts, weak signals are 
those elements that infuse artworks with greatness. 
When we make strategic sense it is in the midst of chaos, where questions are vague and the 
answers are flimsy210.  Our expectations drive us to rationalise what we believe we see rather 
than understand the significance of what we are seeing.   
Amplifying weak signals is only possible if they are part of a complex adaptive system on the 
edge of chaos.  The social systems we find in organisations today are complex adaptive 
systems: 211 unpredictable and difficult systems which do not follow straight line paths of 
                                                 
208  Gryskiewics (1999) 
209  Weick (2009) 
210  Drummond (2001)  
211  Dyer Harris and Ziesler (2002) note that Complex Adaptive Systems have five characteristics:  
sensitive to small changes, adaptive to small changes in their environment, complex, driven 
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predictability.  Weak signals are advanced indicators of change phenomena. Sometimes 
mistaken for Wild Cards, weak signals offer hints about the future212.  
Weak signals are found in conditions of uncertainty where the impact is medium to high 
(Figure 5).  Traditional methods to attempt to predict the future do not successfully identity 
the weak signals which are found on the periphery, although a sensitivity to small changes or 
weak signals in these systems implies that finding the weak signals is important.   Weak 
signals are weak because they are easily obscured by other factors such as beliefs, or 
expectations, attitudes or bias.  Because of the hints which weak signals offer about the 
future, they are important as they can offer insights into potential new products or services.     
They appear as incomplete, unstructured, or fragmented stimuli or patterns amongst the raw 
data which is available to observers.   The stimuli or patterns which form the signal are not 
clear via direct observation, but are an exercise in realising the strategic potential of the 
information.  These signals have to be amplified as they are weak.  The power of weak 
signals lies in the ability of the observer to make the link or association with other weak 
signals, creating new interpretations. Weak signals abound on the periphery of an 
organisation, in the edge of chaos.  Finding a weak signal may herald the advent of a wild 
card, or an event that could be a step change or offer a completely different strategic 
opportunity.   
Weak signals are not easily noticed, and if they are, they are not articulated unless there is a 
culture within which tolerates mistakes and encourages learning.  They are easily obscured by 
mindsets, attitudes and bias.   
A characteristic of weak signals is their ‘weird’ nature; they do not fit current frames or 
mental models of the observers, and are often dismissed as anomalies or errors, until the 
frequency of the weak signals triggers a crisis. Cognitive bias, the use of heuristics (and in 
particular confirmation bias) in assessment and decision making, can blind the observer213 to 
the important information contained within the weak signal.  Weak signal detection is 
                                                                                                                                                        
determinism not randomness, offer short term forecasting possibilities and long term forecasting is 
very difficult. 
212  Weak signals not only offer foresight about the future, but can also provide indicators about 
vulnerability.   
213  Ansoff  (1977). “ Typically only historically familiar raw data find their way into the interpreted 
consequences. Reports on unfamiliar discontinuities, if they find their way into the firm, remain in raw 
form, because the methods and approaches for converting them into action typically do not exist.” 
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dependent on the ‘eye of the beholder’: the mental frames and sensemaking models held by 
the observer214.  In strategy making, early identification of weak signals can create 
competitive advantages, new market opportunities, or totally new opportunities.  Weak 
signals215 are those patterns, signs or ideas which could alter the way an organisation 
performs its business operations, but are not easily noticed by decision makers.   
Weak signals are often found in unstructured data; hence the importance of scanning.  Linear 
thinking presupposes that there is proportionate responses to feedback (for every action there 
is an equal and opposite reaction), and therefore ignores unintended consequences and 
surprises.  Participants in strategy making often overlook weak signals and a lack of 
                                                 
214  Mintzberg. (2005)  “As much as 90% of all information we are searching for aims at supporting 
views, beliefs or hypotheses that we have long cherished..” 
215  Saul (2006). “Weak signals are those ambiguous and controversial bits of information about the 
competitive environment that are typically hidden among the “noise” of the prevailing sense-making 
paradigm and that gradually coalesce to form a pattern of intelligence that alerts sensitive leaders that 
it may be time to change their game.” 
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consensus leads to misaligned or inappropriate strategies.  Arguing in the sensemaking 
context is a belief driven process which can be directed to focus thinking and ensure 
alignment and to surface weak signals from the data presented to strategy makers.  The 
process of arguing balances intuitive thoughts against the evidence offered.   
Mendonca et al216   proposed that in order to improve strategic foresight, a form of structured 
networked communications be used to improve understanding and create action on the weak 
signals identified.  See Figure 5.  Mendonca et al also suggested: 
Ensure that a diverse base of individuals are empowered to make claims for weak signals; 
_  Tolerance of marginal and outlier opinions that stretch or threaten current beliefs; 
_  Collect the qualitative arguments behind those claims; 
_  Use an anonymous argumentative process when it is important to open up new options 
and use face-to-face processes when ensuring commitment is key; 
_  Identify and reduce barriers to communication between different sectors, departments 
and communities of experts; 
_  Provide room for senior decision-makers who can become champions of hypothetical 
weak signals amplifying the strategic message among the community of stakeholders; 
_  Foster the use of network mediation and brokering approaches using information 
gathered from different sources and media. 
4.11 Mindfulness and Weak Signal Identification 
The need to notice weak signals is similar in many ways to need to detect small failures in 
high reliability organizations.  Research into High Reliability Organisations217 shows that 
people in these organisations are  mindful:  they are aware of the constantly changing nature 
of organizations and the emergent nature of outcomes set in motion by actions.  Although 
their attention is rather on failure than success, they shine the penlights of attention on detail  
in order to detect weak signals of failures, rather than simplifying and categorising, thereby 
becoming more sensitive to small changes.   Decisions are migrated to experts wherever these 
are located.  Cognitively we are trained to be rational and to consider a logical to everything.  
                                                 
216 Mendonca et al (2012) 
217  Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, Weick et al., (1999) 
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When we become mindful, and open our minds to the philosophical concept that things can 
emerge from nothing, we become mindful of the small and subtle discontinuous changes that 
we see on the periphery of chaos.   
Weick (2009) advocates that leaders cultivate four abilities that advance sensemaking 
through building mindfulness218:   
 improvisation, or developing individual and group intuition with the aim of becoming 
creative under pressure through surfacing,  
 wisdom or the understanding that complete knowledge is not possible: there will always 
be ambiguity and uncertainty; 
 respectful interaction through three imperatives: respecting the reports of others: being 
prepared to base beliefs or actions on other;  report honestly in order that others can use 
your observations; and self-respect or integration with the reports of others without 
reducing one’s own value; 
 communication as a tool through story-telling and conversation to enable others to 
experience reality and individual constitution and re-constition without losing the sense of 
self. 
Mendonca et at are specific in that they are suggesting ways to identify and amplify weak 
signals.  Weick is proposing mindfulness to advance sensemaking, which as has been noted, 
is appropriate for strategy making and weak signal identification.  Applying both Mendonca 
et al and Weick’s thought processes to the problem of weak signal identification, more 
commonalities than differences can be found.  Communication is seen by both as critical.  
Mendonca advocates anonymous arguing but notes that where commitment is critical it has to 
be face to face.  Weick agrees and goes further to note that communication needs to be 
respectful, honest, show integrity without reducing the value of any person.  Mendonca 
advises gathering information from a variety of sources, maintaining a diversity of mindsets, 
and a tolerance for marginal ideas.  Weick suggests improvisation and development of 
individual and group intuition, along with fostering the wisdom to know that not everything 
can be known. The differences which are notable are that Mendonca et al advocate senior 
                                                 
218  Langer (1989).  “..successful leader may be the person who recognizes that we all have talents and 
who hus sees his or her main job as encouraging mindfulness in those being led”.. 
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decision makers to champion the weak signals among the community of stakeholders.  Weick 
proposes that mindfulness is extended to more people, who would themselves notice weak 
signals.   
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Chapter 5 
Arguing to make Sense 
 
“If you do not change direction, you may end up where you are heading”. 
Lao Tzu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Summary 
This conceptual study has linked arguing as a belief-driven process of sensemaking, with 
weak signal identification in strategy making.  Strategy has been defined for the purposes of 
this research as ‘the mindful crafting of future vision  and opportunity for an organisation, 
based on deep understanding, beliefs, knowledge of the organisation and it’s environment, 
analogical and rational thinking and a willingness to explore the unexplored’.     
Traditionally strategy has been developed as a rational process by reviewing past successes, 
combining insights from the past with an analysis of strengths, weaknesses, threats and 
opportunities in a linear fashion to craft a direction for the organisation.   Weak signals are 
overlooked in this process, which has no place for intuitive insights or the detection of subtle 
patterns.  Although this is a reasonably scientific process, based on retrospective views, what 
is produced is a story, which often misses potential opportunities.    
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A better story and better way to create the strategy story is needed for modern organisation.  
This research has focused on investigating sensemaking, and in particular belief driven 
sensemaking, linking this to weak signal identification in a strategy making environment.  
The research has found that identity of the sensemaker is the most important of the seven 
properties identified by Weick, as individual identity is linked to belief, and beliefs colour the 
sense that is made. Beliefs create expectations, which inhibit noticing, but which can be 
changed through a reasoned arguing process.  Several conclusions have also been drawn 
about the leadership and composition of a group of people (stakeholders) who create strategy 
drawing from the research several factors which will contribute to a more effective process of 
weak signal identification and then amplification.  
Turbulence is the source of the multiple subtle un-codifiable patterns found on the periphery 
of organisations.  Foresight or the ability to predict the future is limited unless these patterns 
can be identified and amplified before strategic decisions are made regarding future 
directions.  The constant turbulence and changes taking place in economic and business 
environments today means that most organisations are complex adaptive systems operating 
on edge of chaos environments under conditions of ambiguity, complexity and information 
load.   
Weak signals abound in the edge of chaos but will typically not be identified through 
traditional linear strategy making processes.  Traditional strategy making relies on overly 
linear and rational approaches to  develop strategy.  Organisations need new strategic 
vocabularies of coping, new ways of identifying weak signals, new ways to find opportunity 
in order to respond to the chaotic conditions, to ensure their own survival.   
Strategy making today is multi-contextual sensemaking which takes place in organisational 
environments operating on the edge of chaos, where subtle patterns exist to be noticed by 
those with improved abilities to discern cues and the freedom to express these as 
opportunities.   Strategy making can no longer be a linear analysis of past success and failure 
combined with forecasting to determine a future direction.  Strategy in organisations today 
should not discard all the linear approaches of the past, but should rather seek to combine 
these with more intuitive ways of identifying weak signals.  Although emergent strategy and 
strategic intent are approaches to strategy making in which leaders and strategy makers 
observe organisational life and identify cues for the future from the disorder and chaos found 
on the periphery, the approach expects opportunities to emerge from the chaos   Both are 
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opportunistic approaches to strategy making through learning by doing which are likely to be 
disrupted by the turbulence which is the source of the chaos.   Without reverting to the linear 
methods of traditional strategy making, an approach to making strategy which builds on an 
emergent model retaining the rational thought processes but enhancing this with more 
intuitive surfacing methods is proposed by this research.  
Information load leads to arousal which causes people to overlook cues, missing the subtle 
patterns which may be the leading indicators for the next competitive advantage.  Intuitive 
thinking which applies tacit knowledge to noticed patterns has been found to be an important 
factor in decision making in organisations.    An improved ability to deal with information 
load can be seen in people with broad experience or multiple identities. These people are 
more likely to notice very subtle patterns or cues.  The ability to notice more is therefore 
reliant on multiple identities of the sensemakers, and a mindful approach which uses intuitive 
mental processes. 
Weak signal identification is an intuitive process through which tacit knowledge is used to 
detect patterns in information flows.  The ability to intuit is linked to broad experience and 
multiple identities as it is the unconscious application of tacit knowledge.  It is increasingly 
seen by researchers as a resource for decision making in individuals, and in business.   Weak 
signals as indicators of potential opportunity are often lost in the organisational noise.  The 
subtle patterns need to be noticed, debated and amplified before they can be crafted into the 
vocabulary and stories of the organisation.  Identifying these weak signals helps to determine 
the next opportunity or opportunities, but the final decision about what is noticed is made by 
people; reflexive beings who make sense through the lenses and filters of their own identities 
and beliefs.   Arguing has been found to be a means to ensure that the people involved in 
strategy making move through a process in which the weak signals noticed are articulated to 
the group, the group then reflect upon what they have heard, before arguing their way to a 
collective agreement which may change existing beliefs.  
The research indicates that combining an intuitive identification process with arguing as a 
rational process which takes place in an environment of trust, can amplify weak signals 
causing new knowledge to emerge.   
In the arguing process, stakeholders argue their way from one viewpoint to another, or use 
analogical thinking to find new knowledge.    The process of arguing to make sense is 
therefore a learning process in which knowledge is either changed or created.   
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This conceptual study contributes to the body of knowledge by proposing a new approach to 
identifying and amplifying weak signals through the application by stakeholders of an 
intuitive-rationalising process to the strategy making process.   
The situational factors which have been identified through this research as likely to enhance 
an arguing to make sense process in strategy making are:   mindful sensegiving from both 
leader and stakeholders;  the perceived freedom and trust among stakeholders to apply tacit 
knowledge to intuitively notice subtle patterns; requisite variety in the identities and beliefs 
of the stakeholders;  both narratives and arguing to enable the team to make sense and reach 
agreement.  These factors form a gestalt in that they influence each other, all need to be 
present although the order in which they are created is not fixed.  These situational factors are 
explored in some detail in the paragraphs which follow to explain the findings from the 
research conducted, and to present a model for an intuitive-rational process for arguing to 
make sense in strategy.  The model has not been tested empirically as part of this research. 
5.2 Mindful Sensegiving 
The need to notice weak signals is similar in many ways to the need to detect small failures in 
high reliability organizations.  People in high reliability organisations are mindful:  they are 
aware of the constantly changing nature of organizations and the emergent nature of 
outcomes set in motion by actions.  Although their attention is rather on failure than success, 
they shine the penlights of attention on detail in order to detect weak signals of failures, 
rather than simplifying and categorising.    
Mindfulness is a state of conscious awareness, being present in the moment and being open to 
novelty.   Mindful attention focuses on detail, and on being sensitive to small changes.  
Rather than categorising detail mindful people explore the detail to understand its nuances, 
creating new categories if necessary to make sense.  In many ways being mindful is revealed 
in the manner in which sense is given: when the leader or the stakeholders in a strategy 
making session gives sense to the stakeholders, they reveal their awareness of the context and 
content of their environment.   
Mindful leadership is the first critical factor as mindful leaders are not autocratic in their 
sensegiving but at all times hold an awareness of the impact of the sense they give, tailoring 
their sensegiving to encourage stakeholders in turn to be mindful, to use their intuition, focus 
on the detail of content and context and ensure that when conflicts take place as they 
inevitably will, that they are quick and productive.  The mindful leader articulates strategic 
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visions and ways of working to the team, through the creative use of words, stories and 
conversations to help others be mindful, see things in different ways, managing the process to 
stimulate exposure of intuitive knowledge, creativity and arguing to make sense.   Without 
mindful attention from the leader and from the stakeholders themselves to the context and 
content of the sense that is made, weak signals will be overlooked and opportunities missed.    
Mindful leaders are aware of the innate tensions that exist in strategy making teams, caused 
by cynicism, stress and divisiveness, taking active steps to alleviate the tensions, although 
their guidance is with an invisible hand by giving sense to the team throughout the strategy 
making gathering.   Leading in a strategy making environment implies personal awareness: of 
the personal expectations and beliefs held by the leader; awareness of the stakeholders and 
their expectations and beliefs, and awareness of the pivotal role which the leader in a strategy 
making session plays in the sense that is made by such a group.   
Leaders of strategy making groups are both sensemakers and sensegivers:  making sense of 
the organisational and environmental cues in order to give sense to the group.   Sensemaking 
by both leader and stakeholders, when coupled with animation will stimulate sensemaking in 
the group.   Control in the form of guidance by the leader plays a role in the sense that is 
made, but excessive control stifles sensemaking, introducing guardedness among 
stakeholders who seek to satisfy the leader’s wishes rather than applying their intuition and 
exploring creative options.   
Leaders who practice mindfulness aware of the impact of their sensegiving, are open to 
adapting to new information uncovered in the strategy making process, actively encouraging 
the finding of new information in their stakeholders.   They are aware that human behaviour 
is stimulated by creating a desire for learning, positive emotions, and a safe platform to 
explore.  As Plato notes:  “Human behaviour flows from three main sources: desire, emotion 
and knowledge.”  Where there is the freedom and desire to learn, people will explore; where 
there is trust, knowledge and experience people become creative; where the cognitive 
emotional process of intuition is allowed to notice weak signals, an arguing process will draw 
in alternative viewpoints to reach consensus.    The mindful leader pays attention to situations 
and contexts, welcoming new information, and in turn encouraging mindfulness in those who 
are led.  There is an awareness of views other than their own, with an orientation towards 
process rather than outcome.   
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When the focus shifts to process rather than outcome, participants become more focused on 
the content and context, noticing more cues than when they focus on outcomes.  Leader 
sensegiving which provides guidance, encourages creativity and develops an environment of 
trust, creates positive energy, and allows for creativity.  The non-judgemental encouragement 
of intuitive concepts and ideas, with a free-association and scenario approach, which is then 
followed by a structured argument to debate concepts and ideas has been shown by the 
research to be likely to identify and amplify weak signals. 
Stakeholders in a strategy making group are those other members aside from the leader who 
give their own form of sense to the group, and to the leader as they share intuitions and 
knowledge related to their particular area of expertise.  Stakeholder sensegiving has been 
found by this research to be as important to the strategy making process as leader sensegiving 
as it focuses the attention of the leader and other members of the group on important issues 
and weak signals.   Stakeholders are the members of the strategy making group who the 
research shows should be a balanced mixture of individuals broad experience and multiple 
identities, deep experience and knowledge, and those with creative identities as well as those  
who operate on the periphery of the organisation.  The research has shown that mindfulness 
in stakeholders will ensure that they notice more cues and hold an awareness of their own 
expectations and those of the group throughout the strategy making session.  
The manner in which sense is given by the stakeholders and the leader to the group, colours 
the sense made by the group. Leaders guide mindfulness by encouraging stakeholders to be 
aware and giving stakeholders the freedom to express mindful thoughts, thereby setting the 
scene and ensuring a trust environment for sharing of intuitive knowledge, and arguing to 
make sense.   Stakeholders offer viewpoints and share insights with the group, employing the 
environment of trust created by a mindful leader to present weak signals and associative 
thoughts.  
Cognitively people are trained to be rational and to consider a logical flow to everything.  
When people become mindful, and open their minds to the philosophical concept that things 
can emerge from nothing, they become aware (mindful) of the small and subtle discontinuous 
changes that exist on the periphery of chaos, and open their minds to the understanding that 
there is no complete knowledge, that things can appear from nowhere and ambiguity and 
uncertainty will always be present.  This openness creates a less guarded approach to 
applying intuitive thinking in groups, which can be enhanced by explicit support for intuitive 
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thinking from the leader of the group.   Being mindful means setting aside the pressing issues 
of self to address the more important issues of the collective.  
Weak signal identification in strategy making needs mindful attention in order to be effective; 
the research indicates that mindful leadership is pivotal to guiding the successful 
identification of weak signals.  When mindful attention is paid by stakeholders in a strategy 
making group, the intuitive-rational process model presented as part of these findings (Figure 
6) can be applied to identify and then amplify weak signals.   
5.3 Freedom and Trust 
The rational and linear nature of most organisational gatherings does not encourage the 
application of tacit knowledge and intuitive thought processes.  People are by nature reluctant 
to expose their intuited thoughts, particularly in an environment in which they feel 
threatened, exposed or where there is no common or shared purpose.  When an environment 
of trust is created, and people feel safe to express their reflected thoughts, the subtle patterns 
which they have noticed are shared with others.   The process of exposing the intuited weak 
signals to an arguing process therefore requires a trust environment, in which the stakeholders 
trust each other and trust the leader.  
The leadership role is pivotal as the leader creates a collective identity and shared purpose, 
building trust and cooperation through communication, honesty and consistency.  Leaders 
should be mindful of how to use narratives, scenarios and stories as communication which 
guides the stakeholders in a group with an invisible hand.   
Leadership honesty has to be inviolable in order to build the level of trust among group 
members which encourages sharing of tacit knowledge.  Consistency of words and deeds 
confirms the messages given in communications and the extent of the leader’s honesty, 
building trust among stakeholders.   Interpersonal identities create trust relationships between 
members of the team.  Without trust relationships stakeholders will not contribute 
meaningfully to the strategy making, creativity and noticing are subdued and subject to the 
leader’s sensegiving directives. Trust is built on consistency, honesty and on-going 
communications by the leader.  These trust relationships foster innovation and intra-
stakeholder accountability.   Even in a trust environment a very directive or autocratic leader 
can create expectations and self-fulfilling properties in the minds of the stakeholders.   
The research has shown that an appropriate group during strategy making sessions would be 
an N-form group.  This way of operating in an organisation which creates more openness 
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innovation and equality among stakeholders, which is an important contributor to trust. In an 
N-form group, the constellation of people is temporary in nature, brought together to combine 
things rather than divide them, communication is lateral rather than vertical, taking place in a 
heterarchy, however temporary it may be, with the leader acting as a catalyst for the sharing 
of knowledge.   
Strategy making sessions are meetings, which carry with them the culture and ideologies of 
the organisation.  The formation of a heterarchy with leader as a catalyst supports the 
development of trust and interactions among the leader and the other stakeholders, creating a 
temporary unit which operates outside of the organisational ideologies to make strategy.  
Short lived durations for group relationships prevent strong task dependencies forming 
between stakeholders.  Group inter-relationships and interactions generate emotions as people 
make sense, and as relationships deepen dependencies on stakeholders form.  Dependencies 
lead to expectancy, which in turn generate negative emotions when surprised by non-delivery 
against expectations.  This implies that newly formed groups or groups which are temporary 
in nature are more likely to generate positive emotions as the relationship between group 
members will be such that expectations of other stakeholders will not yet have developed.   
Negative emotions form in long established teams as familiarity creates expectation of other 
stakeholders.  Negative emotions limit innovation as the autonomic arousal caused by 
negative emotion causes people to disregard potentially important cues, while positive 
emotions stimulate innovation and noticing.    
This implies that strategy making groups should not be the core leadership team of an 
organisation; if the core leadership team have strong established relationships, but rather 
should be a group of individuals selected for a requisite variety of identities, brought together 
for a short-lived relationship: that of making strategy.  The non-routineness of the strategy 
making session increases positive stress in the group which in turn will improve the 
performance of the group. In such short-lived groups where predictability is reduced, but trust 
has been established, positive emotions are more likely.    
Positive emotions are linked to innovation and creativity, and therefore to be desired in 
strategy making groups.  Positive emotions are likely to be generated by sensemaking 
surprises within the group because the group has been formulated to identify surprises. 
Stakeholders who hold minority viewpoints have a greater need for trust in teams as their 
knowledge and experience is often discounted or is examined in greater cognitive depth 
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leading to the noticing of more cues and innovation.  The viewpoints expressed by majority 
stakeholders are subjected to far less cognitive scrutiny than minority viewpoints.   Leaders 
should encourage both the free articulation of minority viewpoints, and greater examination 
of majority viewpoints.    
 
 
5.4 Story-Telling and Arguing  
Mindful leaders set the scene for strategy making, by telling compelling stories to build 
rapport and create a sense of shared identity. The leader of the strategy making session or 
meeting gives sense and is the initial storyteller who provides the direction for the group,  
fostering mindfulness, intragroup communication, intra-group honesty and consistency and 
providing psychological safety for the stakeholders.  
Through story-telling the leader creates a sense of collective identity, which in turn builds 
trust in the leader and in the stakeholders.   The leader gives sense to the group, encouraging 
narrative descriptions of intuited patterns among the stakeholders, and then guiding arguing 
by providing scaffolding to ensure that the arguments expressed are well considered and 
rational.   
Organisations are arranged around arguing:   in planned gatherings of people: meetings and 
work sessions, which extend the rules and culture of the organisation to forums where people 
can make sense collectively.  When groups gather to make strategy they traditionally do so in 
a relatively formal setting, as stakeholders in the strategy making process.  The research 
suggests that making sense in a strategy session requires the temporary setting aside of the 
organisational ideologies, rather utilising an N-form style to create an environment conducive 
to strategic sensemaking.   
When stakeholders articulate multiple scenarios, intuitive insights, through narratives and 
verbalised thoughts they provide the group with a means of triggering conversation around 
the noticed weak signals.   As a group, members reflect on the articulated weak signals, 
creatively making associative connections between concepts, then constructing mental 
arguments using the scaffolding provided by the leader to argue their way to strategic sense 
around potential of the weak signals.     
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Stories in the form of scenarios are important as they allow people to express views and 
create organisational and time-based contexts for concepts or ideas.  Stories in strategy 
making are potentially even more important as they enable stakeholders to understand the 
potential in the different scenarios:  building plausible futures which can be used to craft new 
paradigms within the broader organisation.   
Stakeholders are the strategy makers who tell stories as they describe the weak signals they 
have intuited.  Other stakeholders extend these stories through embellishment and 
connection, creating multiple scenarios as possible future directions.  Story-telling and 
conversations are used to stimulate discussion and arguing without losing the sense that was 
found.  Stakeholders share stories to highlight patterns they have noticed, create multiple 
scenarios for debate, and amplify the potential in the weak signals and for decision making.  
Stories shared in these groups become vocabularies of strategy making; common themes 
which are then shared with the organisation, and become new ideologies, with new 
vocabularies.  Arguing as the structured process of reasoned debate leads group members to 
move from one belief or expectation to another.   
Such narratives make the complex simple, expose subtleties, make debates meaningful, and 
allow people in organisations to use a common language to rationalise and make sense.    
Mindful leaders share sensegiving stories and encourage stakeholders to do the same, to build 
rapport and shared identity, create context and give stakeholders the legitimacy and 
responsibility of being formal members of the group with joint responsibility for the 
outcomes.   
Arguing about multiple potential scenarios is a means of triggering and rationalising debate 
around weak signals, and a way of building skill in intuitive-rational thinking and arguing. 
The natural tendency to think narratively rather than argumentatively inhibits the ability of 
stakeholders to meaningfully participate in arguing.  Part of the leader’s role is to encourage 
reasoned debate among stakeholders.  The research has indicated that one way to achieve this 
may be via the use of scaffolding.  Scaffolding is a leader-driven form of sensegiving that 
guides participants by requiring that they flesh out a mental scaffold provided by the leader, 
articulating their thoughts in a categorised and structured manner before presenting their 
argument to the group in narrative form.  Scaffolding can also take the form of pre-planned 
questions which are posed to the members of a group, to trigger sensemaking and the 
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expression of intuitive thoughts, or the leader can stimulate debate through asking pre-
determined questions after an intuitive noticing has been articulated.    
Sensegiving gaps are perceived where is ambiguity or unpredictability which will lead to 
multiple stories rather than a single narrative.  Mindful leaders are wise and know that 
knowledge is never complete and plausibility is good enough for a strategic vision. Thus 
stakeholders are encouraged to explore multiple versions of the strategy story before settling 
on the most plausible one.  Words matter: strategy is constructed from words.  Words create 
the organisational forms, scripts, expectations, memories, connections and structures of an 
organisation.  Organisations have no structure and no form without words and conversation.  
Strategy likewise has no structure, generates no commitment or emotion without words.  
Words matter to the organisation, and to strategy making.   
Vocabularies of intuiting and arguing for strategy making are the vocabularies of sharing and 
debate.  During the process of intuiting-rationalising in strategy, multiple scenarios as 
narratives of sharing will permit the articulation of intuitive thoughts, and lead to rational 
arguing which makes sense 
5.5 Requisite Variety in Identity and Beliefs 
The research has shown that although all sensemaking properties are important, identity is 
particularly so in strategy making.   Identities are the discursive constructions that individuals 
build around their sense of self to assist them to make sense of the world around them.  
Identity is a decision process as who we are as individuals can only be known once we have 
decided who we are.   
Identity and belief are intertwined, but can be consciously considered through a mindful 
awareness of self.  Identity encompasses beliefs, knowledge and skills, all of which influence 
what is noticed by an individual.   What is noticed is important to sensemaking and 
particularly so in strategy making where what is noticed can be the next competitive 
advantage for the organisation.   
A broad diversity of identity within the strategy makers ensures that there are opposing 
viewpoints, to argue alternative positions and stimulate noticing of cues.   Requisite variety 
and cognitive complexity are created by selection for diversity and multiple identities among 
stakeholders, allowing for the multi-contextual sensemaking that is strategy making.   
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Intuition or tacit knowledge is related to identity, as the more identities an individual has, the 
more, knowledge, skills, and therefore frames the individual has to choose from when he or 
she notices subtle patterns or cues to makes sense.  Noticing these patterns is an intuitive and 
often a creative process, which happens most productively in an environment where there is 
intra-member and intra-leader trust, explicit understanding of and support for the need to 
innovate, and mindful leader sensegiving which guides but does not direct.  The ability to 
notice weak signals is dependent on the multiple identities of the strategy maker and the 
associated beliefs and expectations.   When strategy teams come together to make sense, they 
bring with them their individual and relational identities, beliefs, experience and the tacit 
knowledge which can focus the attention of the sensemaker on the indistinct patterns.  The 
same identities, beliefs, experience and tacit knowledge can create expectations in the minds 
of the sensemakers, causing them to overlook the subtle patterns which indicate weak signals.   
When people search for meaning the solutions which they adopt are plausible not factual, 
coherent and sensible, reasonable in the context of the situation and they resonate with the 
group.   
In a strategy making environment, specialists should be part of the strategy making team, but 
not exclusively.  A balance of specialists, generalists and people with creative identities is 
most likely to both identity weak signals and to amplify these to a meaningful opportunity.  
Generalists or people with multiple identities are less rigid than people with limited identities 
and deeper specialist knowledge, as their knowledge systems are codified less tightly than 
specialists.  Specialists with fewer identities have less frames to select from to make sense 
and their deep levels of knowledge have tightly codified knowledge systems which inhibit the 
noticing of cues or weak signals and builds strong expectations.  Specialists are more likely to 
have tightly codified knowledge bases and as their experience is narrow and deep, they are 
more likely to experience the impact of information load, holding expectations which lead to 
their missing cues.  Those who operate on the periphery of the organisation, on the edge 
between order and chaos, and those who possess creative identities are likely to have better 
insight into potential weak signals.     
The broader the experience base of the individual, the more loosely codified is the knowledge 
base and the more identities he or she has to match cues against when making sense, and the 
less likely to suffer the impact of information load.  The research suggests that a balance of 
specialists and generalists as well as those with creative identities in a strategy making group 
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will be the most effective mix for making strategy, and triggering sufficient opposing views.  
The generalists and those with creative identities are most likely to notice weak signals or 
generate new ideas by making connections.  Specialists are important as they will usually 
hold a majority view, expressing their viewpoints based on expectation, arguing against the 
minority views of the generalists or creative.   
Creative thinkers are better able to use analogous thinking to make associative connections 
between the cues they notice and their frames in a way which creates new information.  The 
mixture of identities will ensure that there are minority and majority viewpoints represented 
and ensure meaningful debate.     
Minorities have an enhanced need for group trust placing an overhead on the leader to 
manage the group but their presence and the proposal of minority views stimulates a more in 
depth cognitive examination of the cues which they present often leading to innovation.  
Individual identity as noted, determines the cues which are noticed, and the frames against 
which the cues are matched, ultimately determining the sense that is made.  Generalists are 
able to deal with ambiguity, complexity and information load better than people with limited 
identities.   Although their multiple identities reduce the number of times they are likely to be 
surprised, their experience base opens their minds to the possibility of multiple potential 
solutions to the cues they notice.  They are likely to be able to make sense of anything 
because their experience has proven to them that they can.   
Requisite variety in diversity of identity therefore brings the required cognitive complexity to 
the group.  Fixed expectations of viewpoints are more likely to be found among the majority 
viewpoints.  These will generate quick conflicts, particularly where the minority members 
feel sufficiently safe to expose their viewpoints or tacit knowledge, to debate potential weak 
signals.  These quick conflicts generate autonomic arousal which can restrict sensemaking, 
but as long as the leader is mindful of the autonomic arousal, quick conflicts are arguing 
processes, which can lead to innovation.   
A balance in the strategy making group of people with deep specialist knowledge;  people 
with broad experience and multiple identities, and those with creative identities, particularly 
those who operate on the periphery of the organisation close to the edge of chaos therefore 
appears to offer the best opportunity to identify weak signals, and to amplify these through 
associative thinking and reasoned discourse.  The mindful construction of a team with the 
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requisite variety of membership selected based on their identities would generate 
opportunities for noticing weak signals and arguing these to sensibility.    
After consideration of the findings of this research it has been incorporated into a 
diagrammatic model.  This model is described in the following section of this thesis. 
5.6 Intuitive-Rationalising: Arguing to make Sense 
A model which diagrammatically presents a process for arguing to make sense has been 
extrapolated from the findings of the research and is presented in this section.  A different 
approach to strategy making which embraces intuitive thinking and resolves the conflict is 
suggested by the findings of the research.  Conditions for this approach must be correct:  the 
leader and the stakeholders must be mindful of their own identities and the context of the 
organisation for making strategy. The leader should develop trust among the stakeholders as 
trust will lead stakeholders to feel safe to articulate their intuitive thinking.   
The constellation of stakeholders to the strategy making session must not be a long 
established group of individuals but rather a group brought together for a short term 
assignment: that of making strategy.  This will ensure that there are no established task 
dependencies among the group, which would cause negative emotion. 
A balanced mix of identities among the stakeholders is also essential: to ensure that there are 
generalists, creative thinkers and those who operate on the periphery of the organisation; who 
will intuit new concepts or ideas and connect them with others.  Specialists must also be 
present as they represent the majority views in many instances with tightly codified 
knowledge systems which will cause them to question the articulated signals and trigger 
arguing.   
Once the conditions needed have been met, the leader gives sense to the session through story 
telling:  creating context, shared purpose and a collective identity for the group, and explicitly 
encouraging creativity and the expression of intuited ideas.  The leader’s sensegiving 
throughout the session is pivotal to the success of the session as the leader provides context, 
guidance and description of the scaffolding which is to be used during arguing, to the group.   
The weak signals identified by the stakeholders are articulated as scenarios or stories to the 
other stakeholders during a free expression session.   The articulation by the stakeholders in 
the group is likely to start slowly as the articulation is dependent on short lived trust 
relationships developed in this session by the leader, and on the manner in which the leader 
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guides the session: allowing the stakeholder the freedom to be creative and innovative and 
managing conflicts to a quick conclusion.   
The stakeholders reflect on the articulated weak signals before they present arguments to 
support or rebut the concepts proposed.  Scaffolding is provided by the leader to ensure that 
their arguments are rational, categorised and will add value to the arguing process.  
The process builds upon Sadler-Smith’s Feed-in, Feed Forward and Feed Backward model to 
produce a model of Intuitive-Rationalising: Arguing to Make Sense (Figure 6).  
People intuitively notice patterns in the flow of information.  In strategy making groups as in 
other situations, identities, beliefs, experience, learning and knowledge, and creativity act as 
filters for what is noticed; the broader the experience, base and the more identities the 
stakeholder has to select from to match to cues in the flow of information, the more cues that 
will be noticed and the better the sense that can be made.  
Beliefs and expectations colour the sense that is made, and influence what is not noticed or 
not made explicit.  To find weak signals tacit knowledge is applied intuitively to notice subtle 
patterns in the flow of information.  Generalists, those with creative identities and those who 
operate on the periphery of the organisation are most likely to intuitively notice weak signals.  
Mindful attention focuses the thoughts of the strategy makers on context and content.  Cues 
noticed are filtered through the multiple identities to find relevant frames and to make sense 
to the stakeholders based on the context and content which he or she has understood.   Once 
sense has been made of the noticed cue, the weak signal is articulated and shared with the 
Group through a narrative process.   
The exploration of minority viewpoints is encouraged by the leader and the group as 
exploration of minority views causes more cues to be noticed by the strategy making group. 
Exposing minority view, tacit knowledge or intuition related to weak signals, requires trust in 
the other stakeholders as once the minority view of tacit knowledge is exposed, a process of 
arguing will either amplify the weak signal or cause it to be discarded by the group.  
Uncertainty will be present as the viewpoints are no more than plausible stories, but this is 
the conundrum of future thinking: nothing is ever known with certainty until it happens.  
Once shared, weak signals or patterns are assimilated, then reflected upon by the other 
stakeholders and explored in narrative form.  Opposing and associative views and scenarios 
are proposed by stakeholders in the group through arguing and reasoned debate.  A minority 
view will cause the weak signal to be explored more thoroughly, causing more cues to be 
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noticed while a majority viewpoint is less likely to propose a weak signal concept and fewer 
cues will be noticed related to the majority viewpoint.   
It is anticipated that the arguing process to debate the narrative presentation of possible 
scenarios will follow the gestalt of Broderiede’s description of an argument.   Arguments and 
counter arguments are formulated and presented through a leader driven scaffolding process 
which gives structure to the debate.  Debate takes place in a reasoned manner, but research 
suggests that where there are strong majority and minority views, quick conflicts will occur, 
and will create innovation.  The arguments presented will either reinforce existing beliefs of 
stakeholders or will justify an inferential leap to the adoption of a new belief.    If a new 
belief is adopted a rationale to justify the leap will be presented as part of the argument.  The 
application of requisite variety within the group should ensure that at least two opposing 
claims or proposals will be presented by the stakeholders.   
The research suggests that expectations will be strongest from those with specialist identities, 
whose knowledge is tightly codified causing them to overlook cues (believing is seeing).  
When an intuitive thought is identified by a stakeholder that does not fit the expectations of 
other stakeholders, quick conflicts are likely.  Provided the conflict is managed positively by 
the leader, it can lead to innovation.   Those with many identities to choose from will hold 
fewer and weaker expectations as their knowledge will be loosely codified, but they will be 
able to make sense of more cues.     Stakeholders with creative identities are most likely to 
apply associative thinking to create new concepts and ideas by linking multiple thoughts or 
disparate concepts.    
Where trust is low in groups, or perceived legitimacy and importance of issues was not made 
clear through leader’s sensegiving, the stakeholders will not notice the patterns due to 
filtering, or if they do notice them, they may adopt the majority position as it is 
psychologically safer.   If trust is high: in the leader of the group and between stakeholders, 
there is legitimacy, and the importance of the issues has been made clear, the stakeholders are 
more likely to notice patterns and share their insights or minority views with the group as 
stories, suspending their beliefs and expectations.   
After individuals share their insights a process of debate or rationalising takes place during 
which the stakeholders argue their way to sense about the patterns or weak signals, 
amplifying them in the process.  Arguing as a belief driven process of sensemaking is used 
within the group to structure a path to agreement regarding the most plausible story.   
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The arguing process will only be successful if intuited patterns are reported on honestly to the 
group by the stakeholders who are mindfully aware of the impact of their individual beliefs 
on their tacit knowledge and expectations.   Cognitive processes of association are applied 
during the debate process to link multiple weak signals together creating new concepts which 
arise from the chaos.   
The group argues their way to agreement on the weak signals, learning in the process, and 
creating new knowledge and expectations.  Beliefs may also be adjusted during this process. 
During the process of agreement, the stakeholders consolidate the arguments into decisions, 
which are absorbed by the individuals as learning.     The process can loop until a decision is 
made by the group, after which the new information is shared with the organisation through a 
sensegiving process which the new information becomes newly institutionalised.  Issues of 
trust can cause the filtering process to inhibit discussion and narrative sharing, and loop the 
process back to the initial articulation of weak signals. 
5.7 Conclusions  
Strategy is a multidimensional sensemaking to create a plausible story for the organisation.   
The stories presented by the strategy are those which are found to be most plausible by the 
group.  
The research which was conducted found that strategy making in turbulent  requires a new 
approach which gives more structure to emergent strategy and strategic intent, combining an 
intuitive with a rationalising process.   Strategy making is the creation of a plausible story 
built from narratives and debated to agreement through arguing to make sense. Arguing to 
make sense can change or strengthen beliefs, and amplify weak signals intuited and 
articulated to the group. 
The intuitive-rationalising model suggested by this conceptual study provides a means to 
apply tacit knowledge to intuitively identify subtle patterns, the weak signals which offer 
possible strategic advantages, and then to debate the potential of the identified weak signals 
among a strategy team in a way which amplifies the weak signal.   
Three important findings can be drawn from this research, although empirical research is 
needed to prove these.     
Mindfulness is as applicable to strategy makers as it is in high reliability organisations as 
being mindful underpins the awareness of self and of organisational content and context.   
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Mindfulness in the leader is pivotal to the success of the process as the leader guides the 
stakeholders, ensuring shared purpose and an environment of trust.  This is done through 
narrative communication to give sense, on-going honesty and consistency throughout.  Both 
the leader and the stakeholders should be mindful sensegivers as well as sensemakers, giving 
sense to the group, while making sense of weak signals, and all the time holding an 
awareness of their self and the context.    
The freedom to apply tacit knowledge to intuitively notice subtle patterns and to express 
intuitive thoughts is dependent on trust relationships with fellow stakeholders in strategy 
making, and should be explicitly explained by the leader of the strategy making session.   
Requisite variety of identities and beliefs of the stakeholders is essential to enable not only 
noticing of subtle patterns but for productive argument.  A balance of generalists, specialists 
and creative thinkers will create the necessary requisite variety within the group. 
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